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The Hamilton Project seeks to advance America’s 
promise of opportunity, prosperity, and growth.
 
We believe that today’s increasingly competitive global 
economy demands public policy ideas commensurate 
with the challenges of the 21st Century. The Project’s 
economic strategy reflects a judgment that long-term 
prosperity is best achieved by fostering economic 
growth and broad participation in that growth, by 
enhancing individual economic security, and by 
embracing a role for effective government in making 
needed public investments.
 
Our strategy calls for combining public investment, 
a secure social safety net, and fiscal discipline. In 
that framework, the Project puts forward innovative 
proposals from leading economic thinkers — based 
on credible evidence and experience, not ideology 
or doctrine — to introduce new and effective policy 
options into the national debate.
 
The Project is named after Alexander Hamilton, the 
nation’s first Treasury Secretary, who laid the foundation 
for the modern American economy. Hamilton stood 
for sound fiscal policy, believed that broad-based 
opportunity for advancement would drive American 
economic growth, and recognized that “prudent aids 
and encouragements on the part of government” are 
necessary to enhance and guide market forces. The 
guiding principles of the Project remain consistent with 
these views.
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NOTE: This discussion paper is a proposal from the authors. As emphasized in The Hamilton Project’s 
original strategy paper, the Project was designed in part to provide a forum for leading thinkers across the 
nation to put forward innovative and potentially important economic policy ideas that share the Project’s 
broad goals of promoting economic growth, broad-based participation in growth, and economic security. 
The authors are invited to express their own ideas in discussion papers, whether or not the Project’s staff or 
advisory council agrees with the specific proposals. This discussion paper is offered in that spirit. 
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Abstract
The American West has a long tradition of conflict over water. But after fifteen years of drought across the region, it is no longer 
simply conflict: it is crisis. In the face of unprecedented declines in reservoir storage and groundwater reserves throughout the 
West, we focus in this discussion paper on a set of policies that could contribute to a lasting solution: using market forces to 
facilitate the movement of water resources and to mitigate the risk of water shortages.
We begin by reviewing key dimensions of this problem: the challenges of population and economic growth, the environmental 
stresses from overuse of common water resources, the risk of increasing water-supply volatility, and the historical disjunction 
that has developed between and among rural and urban water users regarding the amount we consume and the price we pay 
for water. We then turn to five proposals to encourage the broader establishment and use of market institutions to encourage 
reallocation of water resources and to provide new tools for risk mitigation. Each of the five proposals offers a means of building 
resilience into our water management systems.
Many aspects of Western water law impose significant obstacles to water transactions that, given the substantial and diverse 
interests at stake, will take many years to reform. However, Western states can take an immediate step to enable more-flexible 
use of water resources by allowing simple, short-term water transactions. First, sensible water policy should allow someone who 
needs water to pay someone else to forgo her use of water or to invest in water conservation and, in return, to obtain access to the 
saved water. As a second step, state and local governments should facilitate these transactions by establishing essential market 
institutions, such as water banks, that can serve as brokers, clearinghouses, and facilitators of trade.
Third, water managers should support and encourage the use of market-driven risk management strategies to address growing 
variability and uncertainty in water supplies. These strategies include the use of dry-year options to provide for water sharing 
in the face of shortages, and water trusts to protect environmental values. New reservoir management strategies that allow for 
sophisticated, market-driven use of storage could build additional resilience into water distribution.
Fourth, states should better regulate the use of groundwater to ensure sustainability and to bring groundwater under the umbrella 
of water trading opportunities. Groundwater reserves are an important environmental resource and provide strategic reserves 
against drought, but proper management of groundwater is also critical to the development of markets. Markets cannot work 
effectively if users can delay facing the realities of local water scarcity through the unsustainable use of an open-access resource.
Finally, strong federal leadership will be necessary to promote interstate and interagency cooperation in water management, 
as well as to coordinate essential state-level gathering of data on water supplies and water use. In particular, the Bureau of 
Reclamation of the U.S. Department of the Interior plays a central role in water projects across the West, and its actions will be 
essential in confronting the crisis.
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For the past fifteen years, many parts of the American West have been in the grip of a relentless drought. In 2011, the geographic reach of this drought spread east 
into Texas. Figure 1 presents a map of  U.S. drought conditions 
as of August 19, 2014.
The current drought has highlighted the fact that water users 
in the West face not only significant imbalances between 
supply and demand, but also an increasingly unpredictable 
and variable supply that exposes critical municipal, industrial, 
agricultural, and ecological values to substantial risks. The 
drought also provides a sobering example of the enormous 
economic, political, and social disruptions that water 
shortages can cause. Since 2006, for example, the canals that 
carry water from Northern and Central California rivers to 
supply agricultural users and municipal users throughout 
the Central Valley and Southern California—known as the 
State Water Project and the Central Valley Project—have 
Chapter 1: Introduction
FIGURE 1. 
U.S. Drought Conditions on August 19, 2014
Source: The National Drought Mitigation Center 2014.
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not delivered the full allocations of water their users expect 
(California Department of Water Resources 2014). The winter 
of 2013–14 saw the Sierra Nevada snowpack, which supplies 
dry season water as it melts, at just 25 percent of normal. The 
resulting lack of water forced farmers in the Central Valley 
to fallow more than 500,000 acres of prime agricultural land, 
while some rural California towns have come close to running 
out of water (Postel 2014).
These same challenges are replicated throughout the West. 
The plains of Southeastern Colorado are experiencing Dust 
Bowl conditions. In New Mexico, the mighty Rio Grande 
is running so low that local residents refer to it as the Rio 
Sand. The drought in Texas has caused more than $25 billion 
in economic damage. Water shortages have also strained 
interstate relationships: in recent years Montana has sued 
Wyoming, Kansas has sued Nebraska, and Texas has sued 
New Mexico and Oklahoma.
The challenge of increasing water scarcity is most evident 
in the seven states that constitute the Colorado River Basin: 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, 
and Wyoming. The waters of the Colorado River Basin 
currently support more than 40 million people, 4 million acres 
of irrigated agriculture, and an estimated 27 percent of U.S. 
national GDP (Bureau of Reclamation 2012). To understand 
the scale of the current crisis, projections from the Bureau of 
Reclamation (2013) suggest that within the next few years Lake 
Mead—the massive water reservoir formed behind Hoover 
Dam—could decline to levels that would jeopardize both 
hydropower production at Hoover Dam and the ability of the 
Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA) to divert water 
from the reservoir to supply the Las Vegas metropolitan area. 
To address this risk, SNWA is currently undertaking one of 
the most complex engineering projects in the world, installing 
a new $1 billion “bathtub drain” intake at the bottom of Lake 
Mead to supplement two other intakes that could potentially 
be stranded above the lowered level of the lake.
While the United States used to fret about running out of oil, 
we ignore the fact that water fuels the American economy 
just as oil does. The West’s agricultural districts produce a 
vast amount of the nation’s food; California alone produces 
nearly half of the total U.S. vegetable crop and more than half 
of U.S. fruits and nuts (California Department of Food and 
Agriculture 2013–14). Renewable energy from hydropower 
dams in the West accounts for approximately 25  percent of 
the energy produced in thirteen Western states (National 
Hydropower Association 2012).
While many Americans seldom think about water, many 
businesses are becoming concerned about future supplies. In a 
2013 survey by Deloitte Consulting of 184 of the world’s largest 
companies, fully 70 percent identified water as a substantial 
business risk, either in their direct operations or in their supply 
chains (Carbon Disclosure 
Project and Deloitte Consulting, 
LLP 2013). Even Silicon Valley 
giants like Intel, Cisco, Google, 
and Facebook rely on huge 
volumes of water. According 
to Cisco, whose switches and 
routers provide the backbone of 
the Internet, 2 trillion minutes of 
video traversed the Internet each 
month in 2012 (Glanz 2013). 
More than one hundred hours of 
video are uploaded to YouTube 
every minute. What makes this 
possible, beneath the surface 
of cushy high-tech campuses, 
is the not-so-soft underbelly: 
heavy manufacturing to produce 
computer hardware and semiconductors, used in thousands 
of large data centers. These server farms (as Google calls 
them) require vast air conditioning units to dissipate the 
heat generated by thousands of servers (Glennon 2009). Some 
server farms use as much energy as a midsized city. Reliable 
access to water for manufacturing, cooling, and energy 
production, not to mention for the support and well-being of 
the hundreds of thousands of employees who work in these 
businesses, is as critical to the high-tech industry as it is to 
irrigated agriculture.
Historically, solutions to the West’s water-supply challenges 
have focused on diverting more water from rivers and lakes, 
building more dams and reservoirs, or pumping more 
groundwater. These options, with few exceptions, are no 
longer physically, politically, or economically viable. A few 
high-concept strategies still persist in policy discussions, 
Reliable access to water for manufacturing, 
cooling, and energy production, not to mention 
for the support and well-being of the hundreds 
of thousands of employees who work in these 
businesses, is as critical to the high-tech industry 
as it is to irrigated agriculture.
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such as towing icebergs from the Arctic or diverting water 
from the Missouri River for use on the other side of the Rocky 
Mountains (Bureau of Reclamation 2012). But in most places 
in the West, we must use the water that we already have—
in the places that we already have it—more efficiently, more 
effectively, and more thoughtfully.
There are many tools available to stretch local supplies further, 
including continued focus on water conservation in urban 
areas, reuse of treated municipal wastewater (often called 
effluent), and desalination of seawater and brackish water. But 
we must do more. In this discussion paper, we will focus on 
five proposals to encourage the use of market mechanisms to 
increase flexibility and resiliency in water management:
• Reform legal rules that discourage water trading to enable 
short-term water transfers. Western water law creates 
significant obstacles to water transactions that, given the 
substantial and diverse interests at stake, will take many 
years to reform. However, Western states can immediately 
act to allow more-flexible use of water resources by 
authorizing simple, short-term water transactions.
• Create basic market institutions to facilitate trading 
of water. To facilitate and promote longer-term water 
transactions and transfers, state and local governments 
should establish essential market institutions, such as 
water banks and exchanges.
• Use risk mitigation strategies to enhance system 
reliability. Water managers should support and encourage 
the use of market-driven risk management strategies to 
address growing variability and uncertainty in water 
supplies. These include the use of dry-year options to 
provide for water sharing in the face of shortages, and 
water trusts to protect environmental values. New reservoir 
management strategies that allow for sophisticated, market-
driven use of storage could build additional resilience into 
water distribution.
• Protect groundwater resources. In order to preserve 
essential groundwater reserves, protect important 
environmental values, and support the development of 
effective markets, states should better regulate the use of 
groundwater by monitoring and limiting use to ensure 
sustainability, and by bringing groundwater under the 
umbrella of water trading opportunities.
• Continue and expand federal leadership. To make 
water markets work at scale, strong federal leadership 
will be necessary to promote interstate and interagency 
cooperation in water management, as well as to coordinate 
essential state-level gathering of data on water supplies and 
water use. The Bureau of Reclamation plays a central role 
in water projects across the West; as it negotiates contracts, 
shapes policy, and updates infrastructure, its actions will 
be central in addressing the crisis. 
In other settings, markets have encouraged efficiency by 
stimulating innovation, promoting specialization, and 
allowing commodities to shift from one use to another 
through voluntary exchange, while generating prices as 
evidence of willingness to pay for (and thus evidence of the 
value of) different uses. The deployment of market tools could 
powerfully address the Western water crisis through these 
same mechanisms. Market pricing for water can encourage 
conservation and wise use of water in our cities and industry. 
Farmers who have an opportunity to sell or lease a portion 
of their water have an incentive to conserve, invest in more-
efficient irrigation systems, and/or adjust existing cropping 
patterns in order to free up water for trade. Risk management 
tools, such as options and insurance, can limit physical, 
economic, and political uncertainty associated with volatile 
drought cycles. By tapping into the power of markets we 
have an opportunity to design better tools to protect our 
environment, halt the excessive pumping of our aquifers, avoid 
the construction of costly and environmentally destructive 
infrastructure, improve the efficiency of our water use, 
safeguard the future of our farming communities, and ensure 
a supply of water for domestic, job-generating companies 
(Glennon 2012).
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Chapter 2. The Western Water Crisis: Long Time 
Brewing, Now on the Boil
There’s an old saying in the West: “Whiskey is for drinking and water is for fighting.” And another: “In the West, water flows uphill—toward money.” More than a 
century of water conflict, and growing cooperation—between 
new users and old, upstream and downstream users, and 
among municipal, agricultural, and environmental interests—
has produced a complex legal environment for allocating water 
rights in the West. This wide array of interests has also created 
an equally complex system of dams and canals for collectively 
storing, pumping, and diverting water.
This system of moving water has powerfully shaped the 
physical, cultural, and ecological landscape of the West. Over 
the past century, public management of water in the West has 
changed the course of innumerable rivers and allowed the 
building of great cities and vast agricultural enterprises in 
the midst of once-arid landscapes. This vast and impressive 
infrastructure now supports trillions of dollars in commercial, 
industrial, and recreational activities; tens of millions of 
people; internationally significant agriculture; and globally 
significant landscapes, ecosystems, and wildlife.
However, the water systems of the West have come under 
increasing stress. The ongoing, lengthy drought is partly to 
blame. In addition, population and economic growth have 
steadily increased demand for water, at the same time that 
environmental and social concerns over diversion of water 
have risen to prominence. Even after the current drought 
ends, the water challenges facing the West will continue 
due to these pressures and the increasingly visible impacts 
of climate change, which are expected to drive the West’s 
historically variable precipitation to even greater extremes 
(Bureau of Reclamation 2012; U.S. Global Change Research 
Program 2014). To make matters worse, groundwater 
reserves—which have been the primary source of water for 
many Western communities—are also declining in many 
areas, as agricultural, municipal, and industrial interests have 
exploited and consumed in decades the groundwater supplies 
that have taken Mother Nature millennia to accumulate 
(Glennon 2002).
The legacy of growth and economic prosperity in the West—a 
legacy built on access to water resources in a dry landscape—
has stretched Western water resources to their limits. A future 
shadowed by the prospect of water shortage threatens farm 
and ranch economies and lifestyles of rural communities, 
creates unwelcome uncertainty for fast-growing urban areas, 
and foreshadows harsh environmental consequences.
THE CHALLENGE OF POPULATION GROWTH AND 
URBANIZATION
The arid regions of the Western United States are home to 
many of the nation’s largest metropolitan areas and industrial 
centers, including Dallas/Fort Worth, Denver, Las Vegas, 
Los Angeles, Phoenix, Salt Lake City, and Silicon Valley. 
The West has also seen some of the highest growth rates in 
the nation, having gained an increasing share of the total 
U.S. population every year since 1900. The comparatively 
arid states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming saw their populations grow 
from approximately 14 million people in 1950 (approximately 
10 percent of the population) to more than 56 million people 
in 2010 (more than 18 percent of the population) (U.S. Census 
Bureau 1995, 2012). The arid West additionally supports a 
huge, internationally significant agricultural base. California 
alone produced nearly $45  billion in agricultural products 
in 2012, led by California’s Central Valley and the major 
Southern California agricultural districts (Pacific Institute 
and Natural Resources Defense Council 2014). In Arizona, 
the Yuma region annually produces nearly 90 percent of the 
winter lettuce for the United States.
In December 2012, the Bureau of Reclamation released a 
comprehensive analysis of water supply and demand in 
the Colorado River Basin. This study, known as the 2012 
Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study, 
involved a remarkable collaborative effort among federal and 
state agencies, municipal and agricultural water users, tribes, 
and nongovernmental organizations. The Study not only 
evaluated a variety of different agricultural, municipal, and 
industrial demand scenarios throughout the Basin, but also 
matched them to a series of future water-supply scenarios, 
including scenarios built with climate change models (Bureau 
of Reclamation 2012).
As shown in figure 2, the Study estimated that average demand 
for water in the Colorado River Basin has exceeded the average 
available supply every year since 2003. In looking ahead, the 
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Study concluded that the long-term projected imbalance in 
future supply and demand in the Basin would continue to 
increase, and would average 3.2  million acre-feet1 per year 
by 2060—an imbalance that is equivalent to approximately 
20  percent of current Basin-wide demands. A worst-case 
scenario in the Study suggested a potential imbalance of more 
than 8 million acre-feet per year—greater than 50 percent of 
current demands (Bureau of Reclamation 2012).
THE GROWING ENVIRONMENTAL TRAGEDY
Like water from the Colorado River, virtually all water in 
Western rivers and streams is already designated for some sort 
of use: that is, the water is fully appropriated. In some rivers, 
water has even been over-appropriated, with greater legal 
entitlements to the use of water than there is water to support 
them. The withdrawal of so much water from rivers creates 
significant trade-offs between human and ecological uses 
of water, particularly in times of shortfalls. Recent drought 
conditions have forced reductions in agricultural diversions 
throughout Colorado, and what little was left for stream 
flows was inadequate to support the state’s rafting and fishing 
industries. In 2014, low flows in the San Joaquin River in 
Central California prompted an environmental organization, 
American Rivers, to name it the most endangered river in the 
country (American Rivers 2014).
Many other Western rivers, including the Colorado, Gila, 
Green, and Klamath Rivers, have made the “most endangered” 
list in recent years. In 2014, the Sacramento River became so 
shallow due to diversions and drought that young Chinook 
salmon could not navigate their way downstream to the ocean. 
In a desperate effort to save these endangered fish, federal and 
state wildlife officials used climate-controlled tanker trucks 
to transport 30  million salmon fry (hatchlings) hundreds 
of miles from hatcheries to the ocean (Chea 2014). Similar 
issues in Oregon and Washington have caused significant, 
well-publicized conflicts between agricultural users and 
endangered salmon runs. In other cases, the consequences 
of overuse of water resources have been less visible to the 
public. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in the 
management of groundwater resources.
Groundwater has been the saving grace for many parts of the 
water-starved West. Following the advent of high-lift turbine 
pump technology in the 1930s, many regions had access to 
vast reserves of water in underground aquifers that they have 
tapped to supply water when surface water supplies were 
inadequate (Glennon 2002). A recent study looked at data on 
freshwater reserves above ground and below ground across 
the Southwest from 2004 to 2013. It found that freshwater 
reserves had declined by 53 million acre-feet during this 
time—a volume equivalent to nearly twice the capacity of 
Lake Mead! The study also found that 75 percent of the decline 
came from groundwater sources, rather than from the better-
publicized declines in surface reservoirs, such as Lake Mead 
and Lake Powell (Castle et al. 2014). Much of this decline 
occurred because some Western states, including California, 
have historically failed to regulate, or do not adequately 
regulate, groundwater withdrawals (Chappelle, Hanak, and 
Mount 2014). As a result, groundwater aquifers are effectively 
FIGURE 2. 
Historical Ten-Year Running Average Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Use, 1923–2010
Source: Bureau of Reclamation 2012.
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being mined to provide water for day-to-day use. In response 
to the ongoing drought, California farmers continue to 
drill new wells at an alarming rate, lowering water tables to 
unprecedented depths (Weiser 2014).
Allowing unregulated access to a finite common supply 
has created the recipe for a classic tragedy of the commons 
(Hardin 1968). In the absence of controls over a shared 
resource such as groundwater, users have an economic 
incentive to exploit the resource: each individual user obtains 
100 percent of the benefits from pumping groundwater, while 
the costs are spread among all groundwater users. Depending 
on the size and characteristics of the aquifer, these impacts 
can potentially occur across enormous geographic areas. In 
the San Joaquin Valley of California, excessive groundwater 
pumping caused the water table to plummet and the surface 
of the earth to subside more than twenty-five feet between 
1925 and 1977 (Glennon 2002). Another well-known example 
of unsustainable groundwater extraction is the exploitation 
of the massive Ogallala Aquifer, which underlies much of the 
Central Western area of the United States.2 Unsustainable 
pumping of this aquifer has led to widespread groundwater 
declines from South Dakota to Texas (Glennon 2002).
THE EMERGING CHALLENGE OF WATER RELIABILITY
Some of the West’s most significant water problems concern 
not so much the quantity of the available water supply as they 
do the reliability of those supplies in the face of normal (or 
abnormal) hydrologic cycles. Decades ago when engineers 
designed our water infrastructure, they understandably 
assumed that the hydrological processes that drive the 
availability of water in a particular watershed from year to 
year would mirror what had been observed historically, and 
would thus continue to occur within a relatively predictable 
range. Storage dams, delivery canals, and other infrastructure 
were designed and sized based on these assumptions. In 
watersheds that experienced frequent droughts and floods, 
engineers believed that future droughts and floods would 
follow historical patterns of severity, duration, and frequency.
However, these assumptions are no longer reliable. 
Reconstructions of the flow history of Western watersheds 
over the past several thousand years show that historical 
variations in water supplies have often been far greater than 
we have recently observed (Bureau of Reclamation 2012). 
Moreover, in the face of climate change, the patterns of 
precipitation, evaporation, groundwater infiltration, surface 
runoff, upstream use, and other key aspects of the hydrologic 
cycle have recently departed substantially from our historical 
experience (U.S. Global Change Research Program 2014). 
As climate changes continue, scientists expect droughts and 
floods to become more frequent and extreme, average yields 
in many watersheds to drop, and year-to-year fluctuations to 
become less predictable.
These stresses increase the risk that the variability of 
water resources will overwhelm the resiliency of our water 
infrastructure, creating a greater threat of economic and 
ecosystem losses. The Bureau of Reclamation’s 2012 study 
projected that the pressures of growth, inherent natural 
variability, and climate change will subject Colorado River 
water users to ever-growing levels of uncertainty and 
vulnerability. In the Lower Basin states of Arizona, California, 
and Nevada, the risk of water shortages on the Colorado River 
is projected to eventually rise to as much as 70 percent in any 
given year.
This growing uncertainty over the adequacy of water 
supplies means that the West’s water users must adapt water 
management to address the physical and ecological fragility 
of the water supply and plan for meeting urban, agricultural, 
and ecological needs under more-extreme conditions. Simply 
developing new infrastructure to access additional supplies—
or gradually reallocating water resources from traditional 
agricultural uses to meet growing urban demand—will not 
solve this problem. In the future, our water delivery systems 
must be nimble enough to adapt to ongoing variability and the 
inevitable year-to-year disruptions in water supplies.
THE WIDENING DIVIDE IN WATER RIGHTS AND 
PRICES
The physical and legal infrastructure for Western water 
developed when the urban population was relatively small and 
when urban economies were a small percentage of the regional 
economy. Farms and ranches were, and in many places still 
remain, the economic backbone of Western communities, 
generating billions of dollars in economic activity (see table 1). 
As a result of that legacy, agriculture today consumes far more 
water than municipal and industrial interests—using more 
than 80 percent of water consumed in the West.3
Given this same history, the pricing of water also differs 
considerably between and among different regions and users 
in the West. Farmers usually pay a comparatively modest 
cost for the water they use (Solley, Pierce, and Perlman 1998). 
Federally subsidized water projects and low-cost hydroelectric 
energy have translated into agricultural water bills as low as a 
few pennies for a thousand gallons of water (Glennon 2009). 
The costs for urban water users tend to be substantially higher, 
typically in the range of $1 to $3 for a thousand gallons, or 
even higher in many block rate systems that charge increasing 
amounts for increasing levels of use of the same volume 
(Hutchins-Cabibi, Miller, and Schwartz 2006). Even among 
urban users, however, most people pay less for water than they 
do for cell phone service or cable television. In short, there is 
an astonishing disconnect among and between regions, and 
between and among users, in water supply, water demand, and 
the prices paid for the water users receive.
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Such gaps in prices can only persist, the discipline of economics 
implies, if there are limitations or restrictions that prevent users 
who pay lower prices for water from selling that commodity 
to users who pay a higher price for water. As we discuss below 
in the section “Reforming Western Water Law and Policy,” a 
myriad of physical, legal, and regulatory restrictions operate to 
inhibit the movement of water from one user to another and 
from one type of use to another. Perversely, however, while 
the water itself cannot easily be traded, the commodities that 
are produced with water are easily traded. In 2013, Southern 
California farmers used more than 100  billion gallons of 
Colorado River water to grow alfalfa (a very water-intensive 
crop) that was shipped abroad to support rapidly growing dairy 
industries, even as the rest of the state struggled through the 
worst drought in recorded history (Culp and Glennon 2012; 
Putnam, Matthews, and Summer 2013). If those same farmers 
had had the opportunity to sell that water to their water-starved 
neighbors in other parts of the state, it might have alleviated 
some of the economic damage to California’s economy caused 
by the drought while simultaneously generating higher 
economic returns for the farmers.
Many restrictions on the movement of water are, of course, 
practical ones, especially the physical difficulty and expense 
of moving large quantities of water from one place to another, 
unless there is a river or canal to carry it. Relative water 
scarcity in one watershed versus another can lead to significant 
differences in price (Charles 2014). For example, in one well-
publicized case, Prescott Valley, Arizona, sold a quantity of 
municipal effluent to Water Property Investors of New York for 
TABLE 1. 
Irrigated Land and Farm Production in Selected Western States
State Estimated irrigated acres (in 2008)
Total farm production  
(farm gate value, in  
millions of 2011 dollars)
Production value ranking
First Second Third
Arizona 876,158 $4,372 Dairy Vegetables, beef Cotton, grains, 
nursery plants 
California 8,016,159 $43,544 Dairy Fruits, nuts,  
vegetables/ 
melon crops
Beef,  
nursery plants,  
hay
Colorado 2,867,957 $7,076 Beef Corn, dairy Wheat, hay
Idaho 3,299,889 $7,328 Dairy Beef, vegetables, 
potatoes
Grains, hay
Montana 2,013,167 $3,542 Wheat Beef Hay
Nevada 691,030 $680 Beef Hay Dairy, vegetables
New Mexico 830,048 $4,106 Beef Dairy Hay, fruit, cotton
Oregon 1,845,194 $4,624 Nursery plants, 
grains
Beef, dairy Vegetables,  
fruit, hay
Texas 5,010,416 $22,681 Beef Cotton, dairy,  
poultry
Grains, hay,  
nursery plants
Utah 1,134,144 $1,607 Dairy Beef Hogs, hay, grains
Washington 1,735,917 $8,666 Fruits, wheat Grains, beans,  
vegetables
Dairy, beef
Wyoming 1,550,723 $1,450 Beef Hay Other
Source: Pacific Northwest Project 2013.
Note: This table provides data on recent irrigated land use and farm production in the Western United States. The first column shows the estimated acres irrigated, the second shows total farm 
production revenues for the state, and the remaining columns list the most significant types of crops produced, ranked by economic significance. Farm gate value refers to the price at which 
agricultural products are sold by the farmers producing those products, prior to shipping, subsequent processing, storage, and distribution. The farm gate value is normally substantially lower 
than its retail value.
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nearly $24,000 per acre-foot in 2007; by contrast, groundwater 
rights in the Phoenix, Arizona, area were trading for less than 
$1,500 per acre-foot at the same time (Glennon 2009).
The substantial disparities in water availability and price 
suggest the significant economic efficiencies that might come 
from increases in water trade. For example, consider that 
(depending on location and soil) it takes roughly 135,000 
gallons (approximately 0.4 acre-feet) of water to produce 2,000 
pounds (one ton) of alfalfa, while the same volume of water 
could produce approximately 11,000 pounds of head lettuce 
in Yuma. At the same time, it takes less than ten gallons of 
water for the Intel Corporation to produce a Core 2 Duo 
microprocessor; that’s 32,500 chips per acre-foot. That ton 
of alfalfa might fetch up to up to $340 (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture 2014), while the 11,000 pounds of lettuce might 
fetch closer to $2,000 at the farm gate (Schuster et al. 2012). 
In other words, an acre-foot of water used to grow alfalfa 
generates approximately $920; if used to grow lettuce in Yuma, 
it would generate approximately $6,000; if used by Intel, it 
would generate $13 million (Glennon 2009).
The arithmetic is intriguing. For example, if agricultural users 
reduced water consumption by around 9  percent—from the 
current level of 84.5  percent to 75.5  percent of total water 
use—that reduction would free up a water supply equivalent 
to the water currently used by all residential, commercial, and 
industrial users put together. That supply could not only meet 
the demands of growth for many years to come, but could 
also potentially make more water available for higher-value 
agricultural production.
There is also widespread potential for reducing the quantity 
of water used in the West. Thanks to investments in water 
efficiency, many of the West’s largest cities, such as the City 
of Phoenix, use less water today than they did several decades 
ago—despite the doubling or tripling of their populations 
during that period. Some agricultural regions, such as the 
Yuma, Arizona area, have massively grown their agricultural 
productivity over the past few decades without increasing 
their water demand. But other urban and agricultural users 
have not followed this pattern.
Despite these opportunities for trade, physical restrictions 
on the movement of water, together with the potential for 
adverse social and environmental consequences from water 
trade, will remain substantial obstacles to the movement of 
water in many watersheds. However, not all restrictions on the 
movement of water are physical in nature; legal impediments 
are an equally important driver of relative water scarcity and 
existing price disparities. Our policy suggestions in the next 
section focus on legal, regulatory, and organizational changes 
that could serve to reduce these barriers.
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Chapter 3. Reforming Western Water Law and Policy 
We cannot resolve the water crisis in the American West by simply relying on the traditional approaches to water scarcity: diverting more 
water from rivers, constructing more dams and reservoirs, or 
pumping more groundwater. We can provide incentives for 
urban households to use less water (for example, by setting 
water prices so that moderate quantities of water have a lower 
price per unit while higher quantities of water have a higher 
price per unit). We can find ways to reuse municipal effluent. 
We can, within reason, develop some new supplies—for 
example, through desalination. In addition, however, we need 
to create institutions that would make water allocations more 
flexible and more resilient so that cities, farms, industries, 
and environmental interests can thrive even in the face of 
substantial disruption of water supplies. Water markets 
represent an important tool for achieving this flexibility.
Some Western water users are extremely hostile to water 
marketing. Water users staunchly defend their water rights 
as essential attributes of private property, but they also view 
local access to water as an inherent entitlement that water 
rights owners should never bargain away. Local communities 
across the West routinely resist efforts by cities, industries, 
and private investors to move water away from its place 
of origin, and many regard such efforts as either a form 
of economic imperialism or as a byproduct of shameless 
speculation by outsiders. Rural areas fear that water resources 
will be “stolen” by larger communities, repeating some of the 
infamous water grabs of the past (Libecap 2009), and there 
is an understandable reluctance to allow critical resources to 
change hands in the absence of reliable institutions that could 
ensure access to those resources again in the future. In light 
of the often contentious history of water in the West, these 
concerns are understandable and in many cases well justified.
Some existing procedural and regulatory restrictions on water 
transfers reflect legitimate efforts to manage the real costs of 
changing the use of water resources, including addressing 
environmental externalities or third-party impacts generated 
by the movement of water. In such cases, the high transaction 
costs that these rules generate are not necessarily undesirable 
or inappropriate, even if they result in fewer trades than 
might otherwise occur. Trade in water may cause congestion 
in delivery systems, environmental damage from altered 
flow regimes, changes in water quality, and construction of 
prohibitively expensive new infrastructure. Transfers should 
not externalize the costs that they may impose on third 
parties, public infrastructure, or the environment.
By establishing essential market institutions and removing 
unreasonable barriers to trade, states can play an important 
role in encouraging—and regulating—the responsible trading 
of water resources. Water trading offers a means of managing 
growing demands, adapting to increasing uncertainty in the 
face of climate change, and generating accurate price signals 
that drive incentives for increasing efficiency, while preventing 
or mitigating harm to third parties and the environment. We 
next examine five proposals for moving down this path.
REFORM LEGAL RULES THAT DISCOURAGE WATER 
TRADING TO ENABLE SHORT-TERM WATER TRANSFERS
Markets for the transfer of water have developed in some parts 
of the West, but not as readily as one might expect given the 
large gap in water prices that persists between different regions 
and users. At least in part, this lack of development relates to 
the nature of water rights themselves.
Markets fundamentally depend on a system of property rights; 
put simply, exchanges cannot realistically take place in the 
absence of recognized owners and legally enforced contracts. 
In turn, an efficient system of property rights requires three 
elements: (1) a complete definition so buyers and sellers 
know what is being exchanged; (2) exclusivity, meaning the 
right to exercise control over the asset; and (3) transferability, 
or the ability to sell or bequeath ownership (Glennon 2005; 
Libecap 1989). In most Western states, water rights holders 
are theoretically free to transfer their rights to upstream or 
downstream water users. But the reality is more nuanced, with 
transfers complicated by a series of procedural and regulatory 
requirements that characterize Western water rights, making 
it very difficult to transfer water rights.4
A number of legal doctrines impede the transfer of water in the 
West. Table 2 lists some prominent legal rules and doctrines 
governing water rights that tend to impede water transfers. 
These legal and regulatory restrictions originally developed 
because water is typically used and reused within the same 
watershed. Due to this mutual interdependence of water users 
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and uses, water rights doctrines evolved to limit the ability of 
users to change their water-use patterns—including a change 
in one user’s method of irrigation, cropping patterns, timing, 
or point of diversion—because such changes could potentially 
interfere with the rights of downstream users.
Comprehensive reform of these doctrines would be 
controversial and could take decades to implement. However, 
states could immediately act to facilitate effective short-term 
water trading. Particularly important would be for states to 
encourage existing water users to invest in conservation by 
allowing users who free up water to lease their water savings on 
a short-term basis to other users. This strategy offers obvious, 
real-world opportunities for win-win solutions, benefitting 
all parties and increasing economic efficiency. Municipal 
and industrial users, as well as farmers with investments in 
high-value or permanent crops, could provide the capital 
to modernize farm distribution and irrigation systems in 
neighboring areas, thus allowing farmers to grow the same 
amount of product (or a higher-value product) with less water, 
while freeing up conserved water for municipal, industrial, 
or higher-value farming uses. An increase in short-term 
leases would create opportunities for municipal, industrial, 
environmental, and agricultural users to gain experience 
with water transfers, develop trust in water management 
institutions, and create a platform on which to build more-
extensive policies and regulations around larger or more-
permanent types of water transfers.
However, even allowing these limited kinds of water 
conservation/short-term lease transactions will require some 
adjustments to the no-harm-to-juniors, anti-speculation, 
beneficial use, and salvaged water doctrines to create 
exceptions for short-term transactions. States will also need 
to address the impediments to transfers that some local 
institutions, such as irrigation districts, place on the choices 
available to individual farmers.
The No-Harm-to-Juniors Rule
In every Western state, the prior appropriation doctrine 
prevails, at least with respect to surface water rights. This “first-
in-time, first-in-right” rule assigns a senior or junior status to 
appropriators, depending on the date when they first diverted 
water from a river and put that water to beneficial use (which 
in practice is virtually any use). Senior rights are the most 
secure; during drought conditions, users that are more junior 
TABLE 2. 
Legal Rules and Doctrines that Impeded Water Transfers
Name of rule or doctrine Description Effects
Appurtenancy  doctrine Legally links the ownership of water 
rights to the ownership of those 
particular lands.
This doctrine creates an important barrier to water trade; 
typically, special procedures must be followed to sever and 
transfer the right from one place of use to another.
No-harm-to-juniors rule Permits surface water transfers only 
if the owner of the rights shows 
that the transfer will not harm other 
appropriators.
This rule significantly increases the transaction costs of any 
exchange, and thus generates a disincentive to transfer by 
prolonging the transfer process and creating uncertainty 
about the scope of water rights. 
Anti-speculation doctrine Requires the applicant for a transfer 
to demonstrate precisely the new 
location, purpose, and use of the water.
This doctrine raises the transaction costs of exchanges and 
therefore discourages transfers in many states.
Beneficial use doctrine Requires that all water be used for a 
beneficial purpose. Water not used may 
be deemed abandoned or forfeited.
This doctrine creates incentives for water owners to ensure 
its use every year, regardless of efficiency or the potential 
consequences, in order to avoid the permanent loss of the 
water right.
Salvaged water doctrine Prohibits water users from obtaining 
the benefits of water that they conserve 
because the conserved water will be 
used by other senior appropriators.
This doctrine effectively encourages overuse of water 
because it does not allow farmers and other parties who 
reduce their water use to use, lease, or sell conserved water.
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may be cut off. While this historical system of appropriation 
established identifiable property rights in surface water, it also 
generated ongoing uncertainties with regard to the status, 
amount, and reliability of water rights (Libecap 2011).
On major Western rivers, the sheer number of users typically 
generates conflicts. In some states, water claims by users 
far exceed the amount of water that is actually in the river, 
leading to a curious dichotomy between “wet water” and 
“paper rights.” California has granted rights to five times the 
state’s average annual flow of surface water (Boxall 2014). In 
many parts of the West, there is simply not enough water 
to satisfy the theoretical rights to water that exist on paper 
(Glennon 2002). To manage these conflicts, states have set 
up complicated procedures known as general adjudications, 
which bring all claimants in a particular river system into a 
single court case to have their competing claims sorted.
Some Western states, such as Colorado, have adjudicatory 
mechanisms that function smoothly. In other Western states, 
adjudications are moving more slowly or, as in Arizona, have 
essentially stalled for decades, leaving streams and rivers over-
allocated and subject to a confusing mix of paper rights and 
wet water. Arizona’s Gila River adjudication involves tens of 
thousands of claimants, each with water rights adverse to 
every other claimant. Complex priority systems governing 
the allocation of water during shortage conditions further 
muddy the waters and make it difficult to value water 
rights. Particularly in the face of growing climate risk, this 
combination of legal and physical uncertainty is paralyzing.
Under the appurtenancy doctrine, which is an essential 
feature of most prior appropriation systems, water rights 
are legally attached to a particular place of use—usually a 
specific parcel of land. Obtaining permission to change this 
place of use (and in most cases the point of diversion) via a 
water transfer usually involves invocation of the no-harm-
to-juniors rule, which permits transfers of water rights from 
one place of use to another only if the transfer does not harm 
other appropriators. Given the reality that Western rivers 
may have hundreds or thousands of different appropriators, 
protecting the interests of other appropriators necessitates 
an inquiry into whether a transfer from one appropriator to 
another would harm a third party. This rule creates enormous 
disincentives to transfers by driving up the transaction 
costs of any exchange, typically requiring a fact-specific, 
cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive inquiry into 
return flows, irrigation ratio efficiencies, and consumptive use 
patterns of various crops in an effort to predict the real-world 
impacts of a proposed transfer. It may even, as in Colorado, 
require a similarly fact-intensive inquiry into the historical, 
beneficial use of the water right to ensure that the water rights 
holders transfer only the quantity of water for which they can 
demonstrate historical use.
As an alternative approach, we embrace Professor Mark 
Squillace’s recommendation to link water rights to the amount 
consumed, rather than to the amount diverted (Squillace 2012). 
Most surface water rights are quantified as a right to divert a 
certain quantity of water. Of that amount, often as much as half 
is not consumed by the crops but instead either returns to the 
river through runoff or percolates into the soil to recharge a 
local aquifer. When an appropriator attempts to transfer a right 
under existing rules, her action initiates a process of determining 
whether the transfer would injure any junior appropriator due 
to changes in runoff and percolation. Redefining the water right 
in terms of the amount of water consumed by the crops would 
eliminate the need for a “no-harm-to-juniors” inquiry because 
junior appropriators never had access to consumed water. For 
example, in the Mexicali Valley of northwestern Mexico, water 
rights are based on a consumptive use quantity per hectare of 
water rights that is applied uniformly across the Valley, and that 
has effectively incorporated losses to evaporation or conveyance 
through irrigation canals. This system allows rights to be freely 
transferred from one place of use to another within the Mexicali 
Valley without considering potential third-party impacts.5 
To follow this recommendation and thus make water rights 
more easily tradable, states should authorize their water 
resource agencies to establish presumptively valid consumptive 
use quantities for various crops under various soil and weather 
conditions. This reform would shift the burden of proof from 
a potential seller of water rights having to demonstrate that 
no other party is adversely affected, to the challenger having 
to demonstrate that the agency’s presumptive values for water 
consumption are inaccurate and that they would be harmed 
by the water transfer (Squillace 2012).
Although the implementation of a one-size-fits-all system 
to support long-term or permanent transfers might produce 
unintended consequences, such a system could encourage 
short-term transfers of water between buyers and sellers at 
substantially lower risk. This change would dramatically 
reduce transaction costs and give putative buyers and sellers 
greater confidence that negotiations could potentially result 
in a successful transfer. It would also allow buyers and sellers 
to develop real-world operating experience and to measure 
the actual effects of conservation activities and transfers; that 
would, in turn, provide essential data that could be used to 
develop rules for long-term water transfers.
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The Anti-Speculation Doctrine
The anti-speculation doctrine, an offshoot of the 
appurtenancy doctrine, requires an applicant for a water 
transfer to demonstrate precisely the new location, purpose, 
and use of the water before a state water agency can authorize 
a transfer. The purpose is to ensure that water is transferred 
for a particular use rather than for speculative purposes. This 
doctrine made sense in the context of initial applications for 
water rights under the rules of prior appropriation, when an 
appropriator could acquire a new water right for little more 
than a small fee paid to a state agency.
However, the anti-speculation doctrine makes little sense 
in the context of the transfer of an existing water right. An 
entity purchasing an existing water right, such as a real 
estate developer, will have reasons other than speculation to 
acquire the right in advance of knowing the specifics of how 
she will use the water. Consider the example of a developer 
who waits to acquire water rights until she has secured all 
necessary zoning permits. She could face years of delay, or 
even be unable to obtain access to a necessary water supply. In 
a recent example in Colorado, the state supreme court applied 
the anti-speculation doctrine to prevent the transfer of water 
to a development project that still had some uncertain details, 
despite the fact that the developer had already spent millions 
of dollars in pursuit of approvals.6 States should jettison the 
anti-speculation doctrine because it operates to discourage 
transfers in many states; at a minimum, states should provide 
an exception to allow for short-term transactions.
The Beneficial Use and Salvaged Water Doctrines
The beneficial use doctrine, prevailing in all Western states, 
further adds to uncertainty. Under this doctrine, all water must 
be used for a beneficial purpose; otherwise, the water may be 
deemed abandoned or forfeited, which results in extinguishing 
the underlying water right. This doctrine impedes the 
development of water markets because it creates incentives 
for the owner of a water right to exercise that right every year, 
regardless of efficiency or the consequences to other uses, simply 
to avoid losing it through abandonment or forfeiture.
The related salvaged water doctrine, which exists in Colorado, 
among some other states, holds that any conserved water 
becomes an entitlement of other appropriators in order of 
seniority.7 Common sense suggests that if a water user takes steps 
to use water more efficiently by converting to a more efficient 
form of irrigation or by lining a leaky irrigation ditch, that water 
user should gain the benefit from the conserved water. But the 
salvaged water doctrine effectively encourages overuse of water 
because it does not allow farmers and others who reduce their 
water use to use, lease, or sell the conserved water.
California’s law regulating the lease or sale of conserved water 
provides a potential model that other states can follow (Water 
Code [California], § 1241). Its statute provides that water 
produced through conservation efforts is not subject to the 
forfeiture rule, which applies to extinguish water rights not 
used for five years. Instead, California allows the conserved 
water to be sold, leased, or exchanged.
As another modification to the forfeiture/abandonment 
rules, state laws should expressly allow for the temporary 
or seasonal suspension of irrigation of high-water-use crops 
without risking the forfeiture of water rights. For example, 
states could and should instruct water resource agencies 
to develop guidelines, rules, and regulations that would 
encourage suspending irrigation at the height of the summer 
to generate water savings that could be transferred. This 
reform is especially critical in certain areas of California and 
Arizona, where irrigation of alfalfa may use four times more 
water during the summer than during other months of the 
year, yet produce lower overall yields that are of lesser quality 
(Glennon 2009).
The Farmer and the Irrigation District
Up to this point, the discussion of potential water trades has 
assumed that farmers and other users own the water rights. In 
many irrigation districts, however, the district has legal title to 
the rights—for the benefit of its individual users. If irrigation 
districts refuse to allow farmers the flexibility to lease or sell 
some portion of the water allocated to them, that restriction 
encourages perverse incentives with regard to water use. 
Without options or opportunities associated with refraining 
from using an entire allocation, farmers have no incentive to 
use less water, to shift from one irrigation method to a more 
efficient one, or to spend money improving the on-farm 
infrastructure.
Irrigation districts control an enormous amount of water, often 
in key regions. One of the country’s largest irrigation districts, 
the Imperial Irrigation District of Southern California, 
encompasses more than 500,000 acres of farmland and several 
small urban areas; it annually diverts approximately 3 million 
acre-feet of Colorado River water. That’s nearly two thirds 
of California’s legal share of the Colorado River, and nearly 
20  percent of the entire annual flow of the Colorado River 
(Glennon 2009). The structure of irrigation districts, which 
are the most important and common form of agricultural 
water-supply organization, has profound implications for 
water transfers and the operation of contemporary water 
markets (Libecap 2011).
Agricultural water-supply organizations take many forms: 
from community-based organizations, such as acequias 
in Northern New Mexico, to mutual water companies in 
Colorado and Utah, and to irrigation or water delivery districts 
in most other Western states. In some cases, the water rights of 
farmers in these districts are relatively clear. In mutual water 
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companies, for example, each irrigator typically owns stock in 
the company, often referred to as a ditch company. Each share 
entitles the owner to a specified quantity (or a proportionate 
share) of the company’s water rights, obligates the owner to 
pay a similarly proportionate share of the company’s costs, 
and grants the owner voting rights equivalent to the number 
of shares she owns. Typically, the shares are freely transferable 
within the company, making it easy for members to transfer 
water to other members. But transferring water outside of 
a mutual water company or an irrigation district can be 
considerably more difficult.
Irrigation districts are generally political subdivisions of the 
state with substantial powers, including the ability to levy 
taxes, exercise the power of eminent domain, issue tax-free 
bonds, and make rules and regulations for the distribution of 
water within their boundaries. The irrigation district normally 
owns the water rights within it, typically holding those rights 
in trust for the landowners in the district. Landowners are 
entitled to delivery of a certain quantity of water and must 
pay district assessments to cover operating costs. Although 
landowners may usually transfer water rights within a district, 
the district’s governing board can often exercise veto power 
over any transfer of water rights outside of the district. In some 
states, such as Arizona, irrigation districts have veto power 
over transfers between farmers within their boundaries, and 
additionally have the ability to limit transfers by other districts 
in their same watershed.
Voting rights in irrigation districts vary tremendously 
depending on the underlying requirements of state law. Some 
districts allow any registered voter in the district to vote for the 
board of directors, while other districts allow only property 
owners to vote, frequently on a one-vote-per-acre basis. These 
differences affect the willingness of an irrigation district 
to engage in water marketing with external municipal and 
industrial interests, and can sometimes result in substantial 
conflicts of interest between the governing board and the 
district’s landowners (Glennon 2009).
Because a substantial portion of the water rights that could 
participate in voluntary water transactions are located within 
irrigation districts, state legislatures should require districts to 
develop rules and regulations that quantify the water rights of 
farmers in the districts, and that create incentives for farmers 
to use less than their full allotments. As an example of how 
this might work, states could allow farmers to enter into short-
term leases for unused water up to a fixed percentage of their 
overall allotments of water from the irrigation district, say 
25 percent. To address the potential for third-party impacts 
from these kinds of transfers, districts could require that a 
fixed percentage of the water from such leases, the revenue, 
or both be returned to the district to mitigate third-party 
impacts or ecological consequences. If these criteria were met, 
the transfer of water could proceed irrespective of otherwise 
applicable requirements that farmers obtain district approval 
for water transfers outside the district.
CREATE BASIC MARKET INSTITUTIONS TO 
FACILITATE TRADING OF WATER: WATER BANKS AND 
EXCHANGES
Robust market exchanges imply more than just a bundle of 
legal rights—they commonly also involve a set of supporting 
institutions. Depending on physical and geographic 
constraints, water infrastructure, and regulatory restrictions, 
water markets could potentially operate at a variety of scales—
within watersheds, within regions, or within the boundaries 
of urban areas or agricultural districts. Establishing effective 
frameworks and trading platforms for markets to operate at 
these various scales is a key responsibility and prerogative of 
state, district, and local governments. Properly assembled, 
these frameworks can employ market forces to achieve water 
management goals.
An exchange trading platform—for example, online software 
that allows listings or online buying and selling of the 
exchange’s product—helps all parties, particularly small users, 
locate one another, and facilitates the listing of offer and bid 
prices and volumes. To provide more basic trading frameworks, 
state legislatures should authorize the development of local 
and/or regional water banks to facilitate the transfer of interests 
in water. Water banks function similarly to regular banks, 
effectively holding deposits of water rights until the depositor 
decides to use them, or to lend, give, or sell them to someone 
else. Existing water banks in the West serve as brokers by 
helping sellers find buyers and vice versa, as clearinghouses 
by holding water rights in order to pool supplies from willing 
sellers and make them available to buyers, and as facilitators by 
performing other functions, such as using storage entitlements 
to trade water rights (Ronstadt 2012).
Water banks can help to achieve important policy goals. They 
can administer state or local programs that restrict or reduce 
water rights during droughts or under other shortage conditions. 
They can also pool together water saved by conservation for 
delivery or use by other users, or to meet other system-level 
needs. Water banks can help ensure the availability of supplies 
during dry years, maintain environmental flows to protect 
in-stream values, promote water conservation by establishing 
mechanisms to deposit conserved water in the bank, or ensure 
compliance with interstate agreements. Particularly when water 
users may face significant exposure to shortage risks, such as 
urban areas with low risk tolerance, state legislatures may 
mitigate those risks by authorizing the development of regional 
water banks, which could confront those issues through 
voluntary, market-driven transactions. In short, water-banking 
arrangements provide an extremely important tool to increase 
system flexibility and/or reliability (Ronstadt 2012).
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While implementation details of water banking vary, they 
generally operate through a broker, typically a state agency or 
other administrative body that solicits buyers and sellers and 
communicates available amounts for trade as well as bid and 
offer prices (where price flexibility is permitted). Water banks 
can also serve other market functions, such as verifying the 
validity of water rights to be banked and the quantity of water 
actually saved in a transaction, establishing contract terms, 
facilitating regulatory compliance, or managing transactions 
and banked water to meet system reliability objectives.
At their core, both water banks and more-sophisticated 
exchanges depend on the existence and operation of the basic 
legal framework for water transfers already discussed. To 
facilitate the exchange of information, states should develop 
a central registry of water rights that includes characteristics 
such as location (watershed), designation of surface or ground, 
priority, type of use (e.g., agricultural or municipal), list of 
rights holders, diversion amounts, historical consumptive 
uses, and recent exchanges, including amounts, duration, 
and prices paid. Expressly allowing for certain types of 
water transfers between parties, such as short-term leasing 
arrangements, would be sufficient for a bank- or exchange-
driven market to operate, as long as the rules of transfer are 
not too restrictive. For example, California has existing water 
banks, but the state has historically regulated the prices paid to 
those who provide water to its banks (Brewer, Fleishman, et al. 
2008). Because the state set low prices, it reduced the incentive 
to conserve water and increased the incentive to draw on the 
banks. By setting such low prices, the state undermined the 
essential market role that water banks can play, especially in 
quickly moderating the effects of drought.
By supporting transaction activity, water banks and other 
market institutions can also stimulate water conservation 
and increase the efficiency of water use by encouraging the 
reallocation of water from lower- to higher-value uses or 
facilitating more-rapid adaptation to changes in available water 
supplies in the face of drought. Water banking agreements 
with individual parties can also help to guarantee that at least 
minimum environmental flows reach downstream.
Certain localities are already beginning to consider the 
establishment of new water banks or exchanges. For example, 
the province of Alberta, in Canada, has been considering 
BOX 1. 
The Santa Fe Demand-Offset Approach
In Santa Fe, New Mexico, in response to a drought that severely stressed local water supplies, the city council adopted a 
conservation regulation in 2002 that required all new construction to offset the water that it would use through reductions 
in existing demand (Glennon 2009). This system essentially required developers to underwrite new water conservation 
measures. Most developers liked this system, at least as compared with its alternative: a ban on new construction in the face 
of water scarcity. As an example, developers could obtain a permit to build if they retrofitted existing homes with low-flow 
toilets. Residents of these homes welcomed the chance to get free toilets, and Santa Fe plumbers jumped at the opportunity 
for new business. Within a couple of years plumbers had swapped out most of the city’s old toilets with new high-efficiency 
ones. Water that residents would have flushed away now supplies new homes.
Building on this successful program, the Santa Fe City Council turned to more-direct use of water markets. In 2005, it 
began to require developers to tender water rights sufficient to serve their developments to the city with their building 
permit applications. In short order, a market emerged as developers began to buy water rights from farmers.8 Developers 
deposited the water rights in a city-operated water bank; when the development became shovel-ready, the developer 
withdrew the water rights for the project. If the project stalled, the developer could sell the rights to another developer 
whose project was farther along. Santa Fe also enacted an aggressive water conservation program and adopted water rates 
that rise on a per unit basis as households consume additional blocks of water. Thanks to the innovative water-marketing 
measures, the conservation program, and tiered water rates, water use per person in Santa Fe has dropped 42 percent since 
1995 (Glennon 2012).
Santa Fe’s water rights transfer process could serve as a model for other cities in the West. To facilitate the use of this 
process, states should explicitly authorize local governments to link land use decisions with available water supply. 
Construction should occur only if there is water to support it, but mechanisms would be available to reallocate water 
supplies from existing uses. The costs of acquiring the water needed for economic growth would thus be absorbed into the 
cost of new development. A similar approach could be used in preserving groundwater: that is, those who wish to draw 
more from groundwater would need to first identify a demand offset in the form of some existing groundwater user who 
would withdraw less.
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whether to create a water exchange that would provide a low-
cost, transparent, regulated, and standardized mechanism for 
trading water (Gibbins and Zehnder 2010).
USE RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE 
SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
The development of simple water trading opportunities, 
together with basic market institutions like exchanges 
or water banks, creates the opportunity to deploy more-
sophisticated market-based tools that help to manage risk 
and vulnerability in other market settings. In the case of 
agricultural commodities, for example, a farmer in Iowa may 
spend substantial time behind a computer screen, managing 
the risk of variations in prices or crop yield with tools, such as 
a contract for delivery of a certain quantity of corn at a future 
date. Insurance companies, farmers, commodities brokers, 
investment banks, mutual funds, and hedge funds have 
each developed risk management tools of varying degrees of 
sophistication to control or hedge against market, weather, 
and environmental risks.
Water markets should borrow some of these risk mitigation 
strategies. By developing similar tools for water resource 
management, we can build resiliency into and reduce the 
vulnerability of our water management institutions and 
infrastructure.
Water Trading to Mitigate Water-Supply Risk
Agricultural crop and livestock producers regularly face 
multiple risks, including natural disasters, disease and 
pest outbreaks, hail and frost, flood and drought, changes 
in commodity prices, movements in exchange rates, and 
water-supply risks. To manage these risks at the farm level, 
farmers employ a variety of existing market-based tools to 
protect themselves (above and beyond the protections offered 
to farmers through federal price supports, government 
insurance programs, and the like). For example, growers 
frequently diversify sales among buyers or sell into private 
cooperative pools or processing cooperatives. For some crops, 
on-farm or centralized storage can help to hedge commodity 
price spikes through crop sales over time or across several 
different markets. Particularly in areas subject to systemic 
yield risks—such as when many farmers are affected by 
BOX 2. 
The Arizona Water Bank and Other Examples
Arizona provides an example of how a water bank–style institution can conjunctively manage surface and groundwater 
resources. Although not yet developed into a formal exchange, Arizona has been at the cutting edge in developing groundwater 
recharge and recovery projects and a supporting statutory framework to help enhance the reliability of water supplies (Megdal, 
Dillon, and Seasholes 2014).
Arizona allows municipal users, industrial users, and various private parties to store water in exchange for credits that they 
can transfer to other users. Because water stored underground in aquifers is not subject to evaporation, groundwater that 
is deliberately created through recharge activity can be stored and recovered later. This recharge and recovery approach is 
facilitated by Arizona laws that restrict the use of groundwater in several of the state’s most important groundwater basins; 
these restrictions prevent open access to the resource. Restrictions on open access, combined with statutory and regulatory 
provisions that allow for the creation and recovery of credits, created the essential conditions for trade in stored groundwater. 
As a result, numerous transactions have occurred between various municipal interests, water providers, and private parties.
Operating within this framework, the Arizona Water Bank operates to store excess Colorado River water from the Central 
Arizona Project (CAP) in Central Arizona’s aquifers. This water bank has acquired and stored millions of acre-feet of water 
underground in order to protect urban users against large-scale Colorado River shortage conditions. The Arizona Water Bank 
has also provided for a limited form of interstate banking through agreements with other Colorado River users. Under an 
agreement with SNWA, when Nevada needs additional supplies it may call on Arizona to reduce its take on the Colorado River. 
When that occurs, Nevada will use some of Arizona’s Colorado River water and Arizona will use the stored groundwater.
Another example of large-scale water banking is under discussion in the Upper Colorado River Basin. The states of Colorado, 
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming are considering the use of a water bank to store water in a major downstream reservoir, 
Lake Powell. Such storage would insulate Upper Basin users from the potential risk of a call under the 1922 Colorado River 
Compact, which would require them to forgo water use in order to meet legal water delivery obligations to the Lower Basin 
states of Arizona, California, and Nevada. As part of the program, banking agreements with individual parties could also help 
to guarantee minimum environmental flows downstream of those users along important river reaches. 
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the same risks—farmers frequently rely on the negative 
correlation between yield and price to stabilize income. 
That is, when farm yields fall across the board, prices for the 
underlying commodity tend to increase, which can partially 
offset farmers’ losses from reduced yields. In addition, the use 
of forward contracting mechanisms to manage price risks—
by direct sales to end users or through commercial banks—is 
increasingly common among farmers, as is the use of futures 
and option contracts.
In general, agricultural risk management approaches have 
revolved around self-determination principles, with individual 
farms undertaking risk management for normal risks, and 
government programs, such as the large-scale protections 
that are available against disease or floods, addressing 
exceptional risks. Traditional approaches to managing the 
risk of drought (both in agriculture and otherwise) have 
tended to treat drought as an exceptional risk to be managed 
through government intervention. However, climate change is 
forcing us to rethink what risks are normal and what risks are 
exceptional.
In 2014 in East Texas, traditionally the water-rich part of the 
state, uncertainty in water supply prevented farmers from 
being able to obtain crop insurance (Satija 2014). Also in 2014, 
low allocations to farmers in California from the State Water 
Project led Moody’s, the credit rating firm, to declare that the 
State Water Project’s decision negatively affected the credit 
of California water agencies (Chin 2013). In other words, 
irrigation districts must now pay more to borrow money. That 
translates directly into higher costs for growers. The risk of 
future water shortages makes it more difficult for farmers to 
borrow money, get mortgages, obtain insurance, sell or lease 
their water rights, or obtain credit from suppliers (e.g., feed, 
pesticide, fertilizer, or farm implement dealers) (Caldecott, 
Howarth, and McSharry 2013).
Water trading offers flexibility that can allow water users 
to adapt to variable supply-and-demand conditions, and 
to control the physical and economic risks of shortages. 
Combined with simple transactional tools, such as the use of 
option contracts that allow users to shift water risk through 
voluntary arrangements, water trading can help to protect 
cities, farmers, and industries by providing additional tools to 
manage drought risks.
In Australia, robust water markets have incentivized farmers 
to use water more efficiently from year to year: farmers 
purchase water on the market to expand operations when 
water is more abundant and cheap, and sell water during 
dry periods (Grafton et al. 2011). Because the value of water 
tends to rise as the availability of water declines, a farmer’s 
ability to trade water helps to mitigate the impacts of drought 
on farm incomes. The Australian strategy has helped to keep 
farms in production that might otherwise have failed during 
dry conditions, especially those farms with permanent crops, 
such as orchards or vineyards.
The latter point is particularly important, because drought 
does not affect all farmers in the same way. Fruit and nut trees 
take multiple years before they begin producing fruit, but will 
die if they go without water for a single season. In contrast, the 
failure to water an annual crop, such as broccoli, would cost a 
farmer that season’s revenue, but she would not suffer the same 
loss of capital as the orchard owner whose trees die from lack 
of water. As the drought in California worsened in 2014, fruit 
and nut producers scrambled to enter short-term contracts 
with vegetable and grain producers in order to obtain enough 
water to keep their trees alive (Strom 2014). The spot market 
saw price gyrations that put some nut and fruit producers in 
a bind. But one of the largest nut producers in the country 
had entered into a water-supply contract four years earlier that 
now provided water when the farm most needed it. The farmer 
lost money on the contract the first two years, but when the 
drought worsened, the contract paid off (Strom 2014).
With this in mind, it is perhaps unsurprising that a recent 
National Science Foundation study on water markets in the 
West (with two of this discussion paper’s authors as principal 
investigators) found that voluntary water transfers are mostly 
between farmers, rather than between farmers and other users 
(Brewer et al. 2007; Brewer, Glennon, et al. 2008). Spot markets 
provide a critical tool for farmers to mitigate water-supply risk 
by hedging commodity price swings: the buyer secures water 
at a critical time, and the seller obtains a revenue stream from 
selling the water that hedges the risk of commodity price 
fluctuations. The California example cited above, along with the 
larger Australian experience with water trading, suggests a very 
important lesson for the United States: the ability for farmers 
to easily engage in short-term trades enables them to manage 
uncertainty and risk within and between irrigation seasons.
Tradable Reservoir Storage to Manage Water-Supply Risks
Most reservoirs serve multiple uses, such as satisfying 
water-supply needs, controlling floods, and providing for the 
generation of hydropower. Frequently, reservoir storage space 
is allocated to one or more of these uses, with operational rules 
built on a risk analysis derived from the historical record. 
For example, a large portion of available reservoir storage 
may be dedicated to meeting water-supply needs. At lower 
levels, releases may be restricted to prevent shortages and 
preserve hydropower, while at higher levels extra water may 
be deliberately released to free up reservoir space needed for 
flood control. However, the rules governing reservoir storage 
may create perverse incentives when it comes to water use by 
individual users; in most cases, for example, if a water user 
fails to use water to which she is entitled, the water reverts 
to the system and is automatically available to be diverted 
by someone else. This “use it or lose it” system creates few 
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incentives for individual users to forgo use of water or invest 
in conservation activities that would preserve water in storage, 
even when reservoir levels are declining in the face of drought.
Another market-based risk management tool is to allow water 
rights holders whose water comes from reservoirs to carry 
over their water from season to season for later use, instead 
of requiring users to use their entire water allocation each 
year. Adoption of such carryover rules is an effective way 
for reservoir operators to encourage both water trading and 
conservation. We propose that reservoir operators—whether 
at the federal, state, or local level—adopt such carryover rules 
wherever feasible. Implementation of a carryover mechanism 
essentially requires a reservoir operator to allocate a portion 
of available reservoir storage space to be used (temporarily) 
for such carryover storage, and to adopt an accounting system 
that permits individual users to order their carryover water in 
subsequent years. These policies enable users to make better 
individual choices about the use of water from year to year, 
as well as to improve their ability to manage risks associated 
with dry cycles. In particular, the ability to carry over water to 
a subsequent season eliminates counterproductive “use it or 
BOX 3.
Potential Options and Futures Contracts for Water Markets
Once basic mechanisms for the lease and transfer of water rights are in place, creative transactions to manage the risk of 
water fluctuations can evolve organically through private-market mechanisms. Several types of option contracts could be 
used to create flexibility in water use.
Under dry-year options water users with a low tolerance for loss of water supply—including municipal water users or 
citrus tree growers—enter into a contract to pay a seasonal agricultural user who has more flexibility to accommodate 
changes in water supply a certain amount of money each year. In dry conditions, the buyer of the option would have a right 
to use the seasonal agricultural user’s water, while the interrupted seasonal user would use the money received to offset the 
costs or losses associated with the reduced water supply, such as adjustments to the types of crops grown or the amount of 
land in production.
A fixed-price option also hedges the risk of water price fluctuations for buyers, ensuring the availability of water at a 
certain price in the future, regardless of changes in the commodity price of water. In such a case, the seller of the option (say, 
a farmer) absorbs the risk that the value of the commodities that could be produced with that water will rise in the future, 
and charges the buyer proportionately more for the privilege of holding the option.
Put options, by contrast, could give a seller the ability to transfer water at a prearranged price, effectively allowing the seller 
to hedge against the risk that the seller cannot productively use water in a particular year. 
A relatively recent example of a dry-year option contract is a fallowing agreement entered into between farmers in the Palo 
Verde Irrigation District (PVID) and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) (Glennon 2009). 
MWD purchased an option to call on PVID farmers to fallow a certain number of acres during a given year, with the 
resulting water savings transferred to MWD for urban use. MWD paid the participating farmers a fixed amount per acre 
(approaching the fair market value of the underlying land) to subject their lands to a fallowing obligation. Participating 
farmers then received an additional price per acre for the water transferred to MWD, an amount that now approaches $700 
per acre, which in most cases is more than PVID farmers would have likely realized were they to have grown crops on the 
land. This option ensures MWD has access to water at a fairly predictable price over time, and provides farmers with a 
revenue stream at least equal to what they might generate through farming. It also mitigates a portion of the farmers’ risk 
that weather, changing commodity prices, pests, or other risks might wipe out their crops and thus their revenues.
A variety of other approaches are available. For example, a commitment to selling or buying a future quantity of water 
at a particular price could be linked to consumer price indexes, changes in commodity prices, or changes in the cost of 
municipal water supplies or water-supply infrastructure. One creative proposal in the Philippines involved the use of a 
reservoir index insurance framework to enhance a dry-year option between an urban water supplier and an irrigated 
agriculture producer. Under this approach, an insurance contract designed to cover the costs associated with the exercise 
of dry-year options would allow an urban water supplier to pay a relatively stable annual premium to an insurer (who 
absorbed the risk of price variations) in lieu of the variable costs that would otherwise have been associated with the 
exercise of a dry-year option (Brown and Carriquiry 2007). 
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lose it” disincentives that encourage use of currently unneeded 
water—even if such use causes shortages in a subsequent year 
(Productivity Commission, Commonwealth of Australia 2006).
A slightly more complex approach defines entitlements to 
delivery of water from storage (such as a common reservoir) 
in terms of a share of the available active storage capacity, 
with each entitlement holder receiving a share of inflows 
and outflows, reduced for evaporation and seepage loss. 
Entitlement holders then determine the releases that they 
need, allowing each user to manage her own water supply and 
the associated risks of supply shortfalls across seasons.
The Intentionally Created Surplus (ICS) rules that operate on 
the Lower Colorado River provide an example of a successful 
reservoir storage mechanism. These rules permit water users 
to conserve water they would otherwise have put to use, and 
then to store it in the reservoir system for delivery in a later 
year. Users can also transfer the water for the use of another 
contractor in the same state. The stored water is charged for 
evaporation each year and is treated as top storage—that is, 
it occupies the empty storage on top of the other water in the 
reservoir. In the event that the reservoir is forced to spill water 
during flood conditions, the stored water is lost—but it is lost at 
a time when water is plentiful. By contrast, if the reservoir falls 
too low the stored water cannot be released until reservoir levels 
recover to a minimum level. Thus, the ICS rules incentivize 
conservation by individual users in order to generate storage 
for use in future years, while using the resulting stored water 
to guard against shortages and to help preserve hydropower 
production (U.S. Department of the Interior 2007).
The ICS rules also encourage water transactions by allowing 
one user (such as a municipality) to work with another user 
(such as a farmer) to generate conserved water for future 
diversion. For example, the municipality could pay a farmer 
to fallow fields, or could finance farm efficiency measures, 
generating credits for water left in storage that the municipality 
can use later. Though the ICS rules do not allow water to be 
moved from one state to another, they gingerly lean in that 
direction by allowing states to make joint investments in 
system conservation projects that reduce system losses or 
increase the amount of water available to the system as a whole 
(Glennon and Kavkewitz 2013).
An example of an ICS project is the construction of the Drop 2 
reservoir in California, which captures water that downstream 
irrigation districts order out of the major Colorado River 
reservoirs but subsequently do not use. Paid for through 
a cooperative agreement among SNWA, MWD, and the 
Central Arizona Water Conservation District (CAWCD), 
which operates the CAP canal, Drop 2 conserves water each 
year that would otherwise be unusable inside the United 
States (although this water is available for use in Mexico). 
In exchange for financing the project, SNWA, MWD, and 
CAWCD each receives ICS credits that allow them to divert 
additional water from Lake Mead.
The United States and the Republic of Mexico recently 
extended the ICS concept under a binational agreement 
that similarly allows Mexico to store and recover conserved 
water in U.S. reservoirs. The same agreement also permits the 
exchange of stored water between the two countries, which 
is allowing municipal interests in the United States to help 
finance infrastructure improvements in Mexico in exchange 
for the right to use a fixed amount of water, equivalent to a 
portion of the water conserved (Entsminger and Culp 2013).
These types of carryover and storage rules can significantly 
expand potential trading opportunities, because they grant 
water users the ability to store and trade seasonally available 
water over multiple years, instead of on only a year-to-year 
basis. They also provide each user with greater certainty 
regarding water supplies. Each user can decide how best to 
manage her available storage based on information about 
current water levels and projected inflows, while being 
partially insulated from the consequences of other parties’ 
decisions. Particularly on smaller reservoirs, where the rules 
governing allocations tend to be less complex, reservoir 
system operators should consider allocating storage space on 
an individual basis, allowing each user to manage her own 
water-supply risks. Such rules would expand potential trading 
opportunities and decrease uncertainty associated with fixed 
delivery rules that require the release of water regardless of 
whether it is needed.
Tradable Delivery Capacity to Mitigate Water Infrastructure 
Risk
Complications inevitably arise once parties start moving water 
from one place to another. For example, the physical capacity 
to move purchased water to its intended destination may 
not be available, or such movement may create undesirable 
congestion during key periods of the year. Similarly, the 
transfer of water outside of an existing delivery system may 
increase the relative cost of operating the delivery system to 
the remaining users of that system.  
To enhance water transfers involving the use of major 
public infrastructure, we propose that legislatures, as well 
as infrastructure operators and managers, consider the 
authorization of distinct and tradable entitlements for delivery 
capacity, or wheeling, within local and regional infrastructure. 
Wheeling rules can provide a mechanism to ration access 
to delivery capacity, prevent system congestion, and create 
transparency in managing the costs of transfers (Productivity 
Commission, Commonwealth of Australia 2006). 
Separating the ownership of water rights from delivery 
capacity can also strongly encourage trading by increasing the 
number of products that can be traded among water users. The 
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ability to trade water rights and the timing of the deliveries—
or the ability to trade water rights without losing future access 
to the distribution system needed for the longer-term use of 
those rights—can allow for more-nuanced and more-flexible 
reallocation of water among users, both year to year as well as 
during the course of a single year. 
For example, in a system in which delivery capacity and 
water rights are owned separately, a farmer who is willing 
to engage in a short-term, seasonal lease of her water rights 
for use outside of her district would retain ownership of and 
the obligation to pay for her delivery capacity in the district 
infrastructure. This would allow the farmer to resume her 
regular water deliveries in a later year, but would prevent the 
costs of maintaining the unused delivery capacity from being 
passed on to other users in the district. Alternatively, that 
same farmer could rent the resulting seasonal excess delivery 
capacity to another farmer in the same district who needs the 
extra capacity to irrigate a higher-water-use crop. Similarly, 
other farmers within that district would be able to trade both 
their water rights and/or the capacity to deliver water rights 
during a particular irrigation season, allowing the timing 
and volume of water use on lands within the district to adjust 
year to year in response to changes in the market price of the 
commodities produced on those lands. 
In 2014, a proposal for a creative blend of aquifer-storage rights 
and delivery-capacity rights involved farmers in the area of 
Bakersfield, California. Producers of grapevines and pistachio 
and pomegranate trees want to pump recharged groundwater 
into the California Aqueduct. The additional water would 
actually reverse the flow in the aqueduct for a thirty-three-
mile stretch, providing needed water to keep the vines and 
trees alive (“California Drought” 2014).
Water Trusts to Control Environmental Risks
The concept of land trusts, which are nonprofit organizations 
that conserve land for open spaces or other purposes, has 
recently spilled over into the area of water. Water trusts, 
which are typically nonprofit organizations, acquire water 
rights through outright purchases, leases, dry-year options, 
donations, or investments in water conservation in partnership 
with traditional users. They then dedicate that water to 
maintain minimum flows for the benefit of fish, vegetation, 
and wildlife. In times when the water is not needed, water 
trusts can lease water back to agricultural or other uses and 
thereby generate revenue to support the operations of the 
trust. Active water trusts now operate in a number of Western 
states, funded from a variety of state, federal, and charitable 
sources. The Freshwater Trust in Oregon is one prominent 
example of such a trust (Brewer et al. 2007).
Healthy ecosystems are critical to sustaining the components 
of the larger water cycle, such as land and forest cover, soil, 
wetlands, and floodplains, each of which provides important 
ecosystem services. Failure to protect and maintain ecosystems 
can require expensive intervention to replace ecosystem 
services through artificial means, or can generate significant 
regulatory constraints, such as mandatory restrictions on 
water use to protect species that have become threatened or 
endangered. Because water trusts create the opportunity to 
protect environmental values through voluntary, market-
based transactions, they will and should have growing 
importance in controlling environmental risk in Western 
water management.
Making water trusts work on a large scale will require the 
development of consistent, substantial revenue streams 
to allow for the purchase of in-stream rights and other 
environmentally beneficial water transactions. Most of the 
existing, highly successful water trusts—for example, those 
in the Pacific Northwest—rely on substantial revenue streams 
from the operators of hydropower dams, which provide this 
funding as mitigation for the harm they cause to the habitat 
of endangered species. Federal and state governments and 
water managers should encourage and expand the use of water 
trusts as a means of limiting systemic risks by ensuring that 
the funding essential to these institutions is made available, 
such as through the use of user fees, mitigation requirements, 
or dedication of other public revenues.
The tactics employed by water trusts, including the purchase 
and lease of water rights in order to control systemic risks, 
is likely to have significant value beyond just environmental 
contexts. Consider a 2014 proposal for a pilot Colorado River 
System Conservation Program (Brean 2014). The idea is for 
urban interests to pay water users to take less water from the 
Colorado River—not for purposes of transfer, but for purposes 
of limiting risks to the system as a whole. As part of a small-
scale pilot, SNWA, CAWCD, MWD, and Denver Water are 
each contributing $2 million; the Bureau of Reclamation will 
add another $3 million, for an initial total of $11 million. The 
money will fund agricultural conservation programs (initially 
in the Lower Basin, but eventually expanding to the Upper 
Basin), thereby conserving water that would otherwise be 
consumed. The unusual wrinkle is that the municipal users 
do not get to use the conserved water; rather, the water will be 
left in the Colorado River system to help buffer the potential 
impact of low reservoir water levels that could otherwise 
jeopardize not just urban water supplies, but also hydropower 
production, recreational uses, and other needs.
PROTECT GROUNDWATER RESOURCES
Lack of groundwater management is one of the most 
significant barriers to water trading in the West, and is one 
of the areas in most critical need of reform. Think of the local 
groundwater supply as a giant milkshake glass, and of each 
user who drills a well as putting a straw in the glass. Some 
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Western states allow a limitless number of straws in the glass. 
This open access to groundwater resources is at the heart of 
the West’s growing tragedy of the water commons, damaging 
our aquifers, rivers, and streams, and reducing groundwater 
reserves that we might otherwise use to mitigate future risks 
of water-supply disruption.
In Texas, for example, the law governing groundwater use 
employs the right of capture—a right to pump a limitless 
amount of water.9 Arizona and California (setting aside a few 
specially regulated groundwater basins) follow the closely 
related reasonable use doctrine, which allows a user to pump 
an unlimited quantity of water as long as the water is applied to 
the parcel of land for a beneficial purpose; in practice virtually 
any purpose qualifies as reasonable. This doctrine allows 
continued pumping even if it interferes with other well owners, 
drains the underlying aquifer, or reduces flow to connected 
springs, rivers, and other surface water systems supported by 
that groundwater. A use remains reasonable even if it causes 
land subsidence that jeopardizes homes, canals, roads, and 
other critical infrastructure (Glennon 2002).
Some Western states have established priority systems that 
rank groundwater pumpers as junior or senior to each other, 
depending on when they commenced pumping. States such 
as Colorado and Idaho have also integrated their surface 
water priority system with the groundwater system, lending 
a measure of coherence and hydrologic soundness to the 
legal system and limiting the potential for overexploitation of 
groundwater resources. However, in parts of the West there 
is no such integration. Some states maintain different legal 
rules for governing surface water in rivers and streams, storm 
water that is captured before it reaches a natural channel, 
groundwater, and treated effluent—despite the fact that these 
are closely connected in reality. As a result, a senior owner of 
a surface water right in a stream might see the value of that 
right undermined by a junior user pumping groundwater and 
drying up that same stream.
The failure of some states to regulate groundwater use has 
created an ongoing open-access resource problem causing 
widespread ecological degradation, property damage, and 
continuing erosion of private property rights in both land 
and surface water (Glennon 2002). In addition, open access 
to groundwater substantially impedes the development of 
markets for water (both in groundwater and with respect 
to other water resources) because a prospective water user 
frequently has the option of access to free groundwater in lieu 
of paying for access to a more sustainable but comparatively 
expensive, scarce, and tightly regulated supply of surface water. 
Open access to groundwater thus inhibits the development 
of real markets for water and distorts the prices we pay. 
Basically, why pay for something that you can get for free? 
Not surprisingly, a primary response across the Southwestern 
states to the drought of the past fifteen years has been to 
increase pumping of groundwater reserves (Castle et al. 2014).
Defenders of the policy of allowing landowners to drill wells on 
their property without restriction sometimes claim that such 
open access to groundwater is an essential feature of private 
property. However, in practice this legal doctrine offers little 
or no actual protection to the landowner, because it does not 
protect any property interest in the water itself. A homeowner 
on a well may be harmed by neighboring landowners who drill 
adjacent wells that drain water away, lower the water table, 
raise pumping costs, or even completely cut the landowner 
off from access to water. The latter happened in 2014 in 
Stanislaus County, California, where the wells of sixty-nine 
homeowners dried up because open access to groundwater 
allowed new wells, whose pumping caused the water table 
to decline (Sbranti 2014). Thus, rules that allow unlimited 
pumping of groundwater actually undermine private property 
rights in overlying land and connected surface water, pose 
substantial physical and ecological risks, and create long-term 
economic insecurity associated with uncontrolled overdraft 
and the depletion of shared aquifer resources. In this context, 
regulation of groundwater can substantially enhance the value 
of private property.
California’s response to the ongoing devastating drought, 
which has resulted in increasingly heavy groundwater 
pumping and widespread groundwater declines in many 
parts of the state, is the legislature’s recent adoption of a hard-
fought legislative package to regulate pumping, consisting 
of three bills: AB 1739 (Dickinson), SB 1168 (Pavley), and SB 
1319 (Pavley). The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act 
compels local water managers in a series of high- and medium-
priority groundwater basins (exhibiting substantial overdraft 
conditions based on studies undertaken by the state) to craft 
groundwater management plans and associated programs 
that would reduce groundwater use to sustainable levels by 
2040 (Allshouse 2014). These plans, which are required to 
be coordinated with local land use planning, are subject 
to regular, periodic updates and review by the California 
Department of Water Resources. Although the Act embraces 
a preference that “groundwater management in California 
is best achieved locally,” as the governor said in his official 
signing message (ibid.), the law also authorizes the state to 
step in to regulate if local efforts fail. In addition to mandating 
the adoption of groundwater management plans, the law 
authorizes expanded local authority over groundwater under 
the auspices of groundwater sustainability agencies (GSAs), 
which can be specific local water agencies or cooperative efforts 
among agencies. These GSAs may require the installation of 
meters, the registration of wells, and reporting of pumping. 
GSAs may also charge fees for water use, conduct inspections, 
and regulate groundwater extraction to achieve sustainability 
within local water budgets.
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Arizona leads the nation in the development of groundwater 
recharge and recovery programs, which allow for the 
replenishment of overused groundwater supplies with surface 
water and effluent. But prior to 1980, Arizona followed the 
reasonable use doctrine in all parts of the state, which had 
resulted in widespread aquifer declines. In 1980, as part of 
an agreement brokered among water interests to develop 
the CAP canal, Arizona broke this cycle of overuse with 
enactment of the Arizona Groundwater Management Act, 
which applied a series of new restrictions to some of the state’s 
largest agricultural areas and the rapidly urbanizing regions 
of Central Arizona. The Act took three steps critical to sensible 
water management: First, it heavily restricted the drilling of 
new water wells in already stressed areas. This step halted, or 
at least significantly slowed, the 
progression of the tragedy of 
the commons. Second, the Act 
quantified the rights of existing 
pumpers, abandoning the vague 
reasonable use doctrine in favor 
of specific entitlements to the use 
of groundwater. Third, it made 
those rights at least partially 
transferable, and allowed for 
the development of tradable 
credits in reclaimed water. The 
workability of the Arizona Water 
Bank system described earlier is 
based on the 1980 groundwater 
protection legislation.
The Arizona system provides a 
model that California’s newly 
minted GSAs could use as they begin to manage precious 
groundwater resources: first, GSAs should quantify existing 
pumpers’ groundwater rights, require existing well owners 
to register with the state, and require that well owners install 
water meters that measure the water pumped. Second, 
GSAs must invest in better groundwater data collection and 
reporting—probably the most-neglected category of water 
data collection throughout the West. Some states have little 
idea how many groundwater wells have been drilled or how 
much water those wells pump. Even in Arizona, the state 
requires groundwater use to be measured and reported in 
only seven of the state’s fifty-one groundwater basins. Prior to 
its recent legislation, California failed to regulate how much 
water well owners may pump or even require well owners to 
report how much water they do pump (Pitzer 2014; Weiser 
2014). Farmers, especially, have resisted state efforts to obtain 
well pumping data in California (Stapley 2014).
Third, GSAs should adopt groundwater management rules 
that will halt or reverse groundwater declines by requiring 
groundwater use to be based, where possible, on established 
water budgets for individual groundwater basins. This step will 
protect surface water users from the effects of groundwater 
pumping, and protect groundwater pumpers from each other.
Across the West in states that lack integrated management 
of surface water and groundwater, states should consider, 
where feasible, allocation of groundwater based on sustained-
yield budgets that ensure groundwater withdrawals neither 
undermine the contribution of groundwater to surface water 
systems nor degrade the environment. In aquifer systems 
that lack hydrological interconnections with surface water, 
groundwater allocations should be based on safe-yield 
budgets that balance aquifer recharge and groundwater 
withdrawals (and any natural discharges) over time. In areas 
where groundwater recharge is feasible, states should develop 
rules and regulations that provide incentives for groundwater 
recharge and recovery programs. These programs should 
create tradable credits for recharged water, both as a means 
to increase the resilience of water management in the face of 
potential shortages and as a means to offset new or expanded 
groundwater use.
To limit the harm from access to groundwater as a common-
pool resource, states should require permits for drilling new 
water wells. As a condition of issuing such a permit, states 
should require that any new pumper offset or mitigate aquifer 
impacts by acquiring and retiring an existing pumper’s rights. 
Utah has enacted a demand-offset system that provides one 
example of how this can work (Glennon 2009).
Finally, proper management of groundwater will also require 
significantly improved understanding of many aquifer 
systems, a burden that will fall to both the U.S. Geological 
Survey and to state departments of water resources. At a 
minimum, states will need to focus on studies of water basins 
Some states have little idea how many 
groundwater wells have been drilled or 
how much water those wells pump.
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where groundwater overdraft has reduced surface flows, or 
already caused other observable problems. This will require 
increases to agency budgets, which have been cut significantly 
at both the federal and state levels.
CONTINUE AND EXPAND FEDERAL LEADERSHIP 
Although the management of water rights largely rests with 
state governments, the federal government has played an 
enormous role in the development and management of water 
in the Western United States (Glennon 2005). The Bureau of 
Reclamation has developed, managed, and operated most 
large dams, reservoirs, diversions, pipelines, and irrigation 
projects across the region. In addition, because many 
irrigation projects originated under Reclamation, the laws and 
policies governing these projects have significant implications 
for the conditions that govern water storage and transfers. 
Uncertainties related to these rights have broad impacts 
across the West. The federal government has a key role to 
play in assisting the development of water markets through 
its leadership on water issues, facilitating large-scale planning 
and interstate cooperation, developing critical data and 
information, modernizing the management of existing federal 
projects, and reforming existing federal agricultural policies.
Reclamation has emerged as a leader in efforts to reform 
Western water management, confront growing imbalances in 
water supply and demand, face the realities and uncertainties 
of climate change, address past environmental harms, and 
engage in efforts to adapt to increased uncertainty and 
manage water-supply risk. Most importantly, Reclamation’s 
role has been growing as an effective facilitator of interstate 
communication, the development of new interstate 
agreements, and stakeholder-driven cooperative efforts on 
Western water management.
The 2012 Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand 
Study (Bureau of Reclamation 2012), discussed earlier, 
demonstrates this facilitative leadership role, bringing 
together a diverse set of stakeholders across seven Western 
states to develop a common understanding of water resource 
challenges and potential multistate solutions, including water 
banking and other market-driven solutions. Reclamation is 
currently undertaking similar studies in twenty-two river 
basins across the West—providing a venue for interstate and 
inter-stakeholder planning, supported by extensive federal 
technical expertise, in which exploration of both traditional 
water management solutions and new potential market-based 
solutions can occur.
In many parts of the West, water management is impeded 
because water diversions are only estimated and are not 
measured, or are not reported at all. A critical aspect of 
the Western water crisis is the lack of reliable information 
about the quantity of water available and actual water use, 
which hampers both effective water management and the 
development of water markets. As one step in the direction of 
improved data, the Bureau of Reclamation should require as 
a condition in new contracts or renewal of existing contracts 
that contractors have meters or other effective measurement 
devices to measure the quantity of surface water diverted or 
groundwater pumped. More broadly, the federal government 
has an important role to play in supporting and coordinating 
state and local efforts to generate accurate data with regard to 
stream flows and diversions, water quality and salinity levels, 
groundwater pumping, and the ultimate uses of water in rural 
and urban areas.
Reclamation’s vast infrastructure of dams and canals will 
also ensure it has a critical role in hindering or facilitating 
transfers. Much of this water-related infrastructure is decades 
old, with some of it going back a century. As Reclamation 
prepares to modernize its infrastructure, the enormous costs 
involved will guarantee active engagement by members of 
Congress, federal agencies, state governments, water users, 
and the environmental community.
As Bureau of Reclamation contracts come up for renewal, 
federal courts have recently insisted that Reclamation take 
a fresh look at environmental issues that were not on the 
radar in the mid-twentieth century when the Bureau built 
much of its infrastructure.10 The enormous infusion of new 
funds to rehabilitate aging dams and canals will create an 
opportunity for Congress to revisit and modify some of the 
subsidy assumptions built into early contracts and to address 
whether and how contractors will be able to transfer rights to 
Reclamation project water.
The federal government could also provide increased 
certainty to districts and farmers by altering its approach to 
the administration of contracts and water rights in order to 
provide a stable platform for trading. Building on existing 
efforts, Reclamation could heighten its impact on water 
management through pro-conservation regulations and 
programs. For example, Reclamation could encourage, within 
its jurisdiction, rules and regulations that require irrigation 
districts to allow individual farmers an opportunity to benefit 
from conserving water; it could also undertake pilot projects 
to test the viability of conservation approaches (e.g., using 
drip irrigation to grow alfalfa or suspending summertime 
irrigation of alfalfa). Congress could also play a role by 
authorizing water transfers from Reclamation projects by 
individual farmers and not just by irrigation districts. In 1992, 
Congress took this approach in the Central Valley Project 
Improvement Act (Thompson 1993). As a step toward broader 
water marketing, Congress should require irrigation districts 
to allow farmers to transfer a portion of the water they use.
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Federal agricultural policies, including the substantial 
subsidies and price supports afforded to many agricultural 
users of water, also have a significant impact on Western water. 
In many cases these policies have encouraged less-efficient 
agricultural production and higher water use, and have 
served as a brake on water marketing. A 2006 Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) report documented how these policies 
discourage the reallocation of water (CBO 2006). Any major 
effort at water reallocation to meet the uncertainties and 
growing water demands will necessitate a reexamination of 
current federal agricultural policies. For example, federal 
support for dairy producers, such as by purchasing surplus 
dairy products when prices are low, encourages the use of 
water to grow alfalfa. Through price supports for sugar beets, 
the federal government similarly encourages Western farmers 
to grow one of the most water-intensive crops (CBO 2006). The 
federal Environmental Quality Incentives Program, which 
originally aimed to conserve water by financing more-efficient 
irrigation systems, has reportedly led to increases in water use 
as farmers irrigate more acres with the resulting conserved 
water (Fereday and Creamer 2010; Nixon 2013).
The importance of these and other potential federal roles as 
a leader of change in Western water is difficult to overstate. 
While Western water management has been and will remain 
the province of state governments, states are also subject 
to powerful political pressure from an ever-changing 
constellation of interests—sometimes farm groups, sometimes 
municipal interests, sometimes environmental interests—to 
take steps that inhibit flexibility in water management that 
would allow for water trading. These pressures are particularly 
strong in the interstate context, where states are often reluctant 
to allow more water to leave the state. Interstate cooperation 
has generally been difficult to achieve without strong federal 
facilitation (and, occasionally, the threat of federal intervention 
in the event that interstate cooperation cannot be achieved). 
Continuing federal leadership will be essential to encouraging 
more-flexible water management, reducing barriers to trade, 
and developing essential market institutions.
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Won’t water marketing hurt American farmers and rural 
communities?
Farmers are savvy businesspeople who understand the 
opportunities markets provide. If a housing developer 
approaches a farmer with an offer to purchase water rights, 
the farmer has four options. First, the farmer might decline 
the offer, whether because the offered price is too low or for 
any other reason. Second, the farmer might look around and 
notice that the forty acres behind the barn have mostly clay 
soil, with a low crop yield in bushels per acre. The farmer 
might decide to fallow this land and sell the conserved water 
to the developer for profit. Third, the farmer might sell the 
conserved water and use the proceeds to modernize the 
farm’s irrigation infrastructure. In the case of one rancher in 
Oregon, $700,000 offered by the Oregon Water Trust allowed 
a ranching family to install a center-pivot irrigation system. 
The new system enabled that family to grow just as much 
alfalfa with less water—a win-win solution (Glennon 2009).
Finally, the farmer may adjust the crop mix by entering higher-
value niche markets or identifying new growing techniques. 
One niche market, baby lettuce, has boomed in popularity 
over the past decade. Farmers who shift from iceberg lettuce 
to baby lettuce and spring mixes generate higher revenues with 
lower labor costs and lower water consumption. In California’s 
Coachella Valley, some farmers have switched from flood to drip 
irrigation, and have moved from growing alfalfa to growing 
higher-value dates, fruits, and vegetables. Their income has 
risen as their water use has dropped (Glennon 2009).
Farmers have considerable experience in making adjustments, 
as weather and market conditions for inputs and crops shift 
every year and over time. Water markets offer farmers 
increased flexibility to look after their own economic interests.
It is true that many water transfers will involve moving water 
from agriculture to other uses, as discussed earlier. However, 
this reduction need not come at the expense of the value of farm 
output, or at the expense of rural communities, particularly if 
it is accomplished by modernizing agricultural infrastructure. 
For example, almost half of the 
60  million irrigated acres in 
the United States are watered 
by flood irrigation, despite its 
relative inefficiency. By contrast, 
the most efficient method of 
irrigation—micro-irrigation, 
which emits a precise quantity 
of water to each plant or tree—
is used on only 6  percent of 
the West’s irrigated fields 
(Sabo and Glennon 2013). 
Recent experiments with the 
installation of subsurface drip 
irrigation systems on alfalfa 
farms suggest that these systems 
can result in both higher yields 
and lower water use. In every Western state there are more 
acres of irrigated alfalfa than any other crop; as such, the 
water savings from scaling up subsurface drip irrigation could 
potentially be enormous (Blake 2009).
Not surprisingly, the farming areas that have achieved the 
greatest efficiency gains with reduced water typically grow the 
highest-value crops (such as the lettuce fields of Yuma or the 
citrus and nuts of Central California), or have been subject 
to regulatory requirements that have mandated specific 
levels of agricultural water-use efficiency (such as in Central 
Arizona). Were states to make short-term leasing options 
readily available as we have proposed, these options would 
Chapter 4. Questions and Concerns
Water markets offer farmers increased flexibility  
to look after their own economic interests. 
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drive municipal and industrial users to help fund irrigation 
modernization in exchange for use of the water conserved—
allowing farming communities to remain vibrant as they 
grow the same (or greater) amounts of product with less water.
Does water marketing transform water—a resource essential 
to life—into just another commodity?
Some critics of water marketing believe that it values water 
as just another marketable commodity, no different from oil 
and lumber. But in the United States water is already treated 
as an economic good, though in an incomplete and disjointed 
manner. Ever since the 1850s, with the development of the 
prior appropriation system, states have recognized rights to 
the use of water. These use rights are property rights; in some 
states they are even conveyed by a deed, just as is the sale of 
one’s home. Most U.S. households and firms pay a monetary 
bill for the water they consume.
Rather than decrying a system already in place, we should 
employ it to help us solve the water crisis. Treating water as 
a property right but failing to clearly define that right got us 
into the crisis in the first place. By allowing limitless straws in 
the milkshake glass, we have encouraged grotesque overuse 
of a critical public resource. It is a classic example of the 
tragedy of the commons: because no one had exclusive rights 
to the resource, everyone had an incentive to exploit it. If we 
strengthen the use rights that farmers, industry, and others 
already have in water by permitting them to sell or lease 
their water, we create incentives to utilize the resource more 
productively.
What about environmental and cultural values linked to 
water?
Water has economic value but it is also a public resource with 
important cultural, spiritual, and environmental values. The 
state should play a role in protecting these noneconomic 
values. Securing water for high-value urban projects should 
not come at the expense of those other interests, and continued 
state and federal oversight and regulation of water will remain 
critical to protecting those values.
The current system of granting property rights to water 
and allocating water supplies often does too little to protect 
these noneconomic values. During the early stages of 
water infrastructure development in the West, ecological 
values received scant attention. Consequently, few rivers 
have protections for minimum flow levels. Most water 
infrastructure projects, particularly dams, were not designed 
to incorporate the protection of environmental or ecosystem 
values into their operation; where they are included, they are 
typically included only to the extent necessary to meet specific 
regulatory objectives, such as the protection of an endangered 
species. As a result, ecological values face significant exposure 
to water-supply risk within Western water management 
systems, an exposure that peaks during dry conditions.
A greater use of clear property rights and water trading can 
benefit the environment by reducing pressure to build more 
dams, divert more surface water, and drill new wells in 
order to meet the needs of growing populations, agriculture, 
and industry. In the absence of more-flexible approaches to 
managing demand and the risk of disrupted water supplies, 
growth will continue to drive these environmentally harmful 
alternatives.
Environmental interests can also potentially use market 
transactions to create direct environmental benefits through 
the use of water trusts and similar institutions. As noted 
above, water trusts have successfully purchased or leased water 
from ranchers and farmers in many Western states to secure 
flows for critical reaches of rivers. Environmentally conscious 
landowners have partnered with the Nature Conservancy in 
hundreds of transactions that have protected sensitive streams 
and rivers.
In order for water trusts to work at scale, however, water 
trusts will need access to consistent, substantial revenue 
streams to allow for the purchase of in-stream rights and 
other environmentally beneficial water transactions. These 
funds cannot realistically be derived from charitable sources; 
it is neither feasible nor desirable to place the entire burden 
of protecting critical Western ecosystems on nonprofit 
environmental organizations. Thus, making water markets 
work for the environment will require not just rules to protect 
critical resources, but also the dedication of public funds to 
meet environmental needs. Australia, for example, is known 
worldwide for its strong support of water markets. Less well 
known is that most of the transfers have been government-
funded acquisitions of agricultural water rights, which the 
Commonwealth then dedicated to in-stream flows in the 
Murray-Darling Basin. The Commonwealth spent between 
$5 billion and $6 billion retiring lands, fallowing fields, lining 
canals, and modernizing irrigation systems (Grafton et al. 
2011).
The West has a proud social, cultural, and environmental 
heritage built on the availability of secure supplies of water, 
local control over community destiny, and the preservation 
of agricultural and ranching enterprises, public lands and 
resources, and rural and urban quality of life. Preservation of 
that heritage is a worthy end in itself. However, the growing 
water crisis in the West also fundamentally threatens those 
same values. Faithful to that heritage, market-oriented reforms 
will encourage conservation, stewardship, and reallocation.
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Won’t water marketing just allow historical users to reap 
windfall profits?
Some people object to the idea that farmers who paid nothing 
for the right to use water under the prior appropriation or 
reasonable use doctrines should be able to turn around and 
sell the water for a huge profit. This concern is particularly 
acute given that tens of thousands of Western farmers and 
ranchers receive water through historically subsidized Bureau 
of Reclamation irrigation projects. The federal government 
built the infrastructure and then asked the beneficiaries to 
repay only a fraction of the costs, often in the form of zero-
interest loans stretched out over fifty years. The government, 
some argue, should reap the benefit from its largesse, rather 
than allow farmers and ranchers to realize windfall profits.
From a fairness standpoint, this argument has some merit, but 
it is worth remembering that many of the original recipients 
of the windfall are long gone. Subsequent purchasers of lands 
irrigated by those projects paid higher prices because of the 
value of the water subsidy included with the purchase. It is 
impossible to turn back the clock and try to claw back the 
value of water contracts given many decades ago. But whatever 
the philosophical merits of trying to go beyond voluntary 
transactions and seize water rights back from farmers at 
below-market rates, such an approach would create a legal and 
political snarl that would last for decades.
The practical question for the present is how to deal with the 
facts on the ground. If existing water rights holders cannot 
profit from leasing or selling water, which they have the legal 
rights to use, they will keep using that water to grow crops—
and in some cases, relatively water-intensive, low-value 
crops. It is that simple. If we want to encourage agricultural 
producers to shift away from water-hungry, low-value crops, 
we must give them an incentive to do so. And that incentive is 
money. Given a choice between allowing farmers and ranchers 
to profit from the lease or sale of water rights on the one hand, 
and incentivizing them to continue to use large quantities 
of water to grow a low-value crop on the other, we think the 
choice is easy.
Where water is transferred for urban use, the cities that 
purchase water can spread the costs across a significant 
economic base, including the developers and industry that 
will benefit most from new supplies. Our focus should be on 
the current ownership and value of the water, not on how we 
might have preferred water rights law to have evolved in the 
past, nor on what the farmers originally paid for it.
The Hamilton Project  •  Brookings   |   Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment  31
The management of water has shaped the physical, cultural, economic, and ecological landscape of the American West. More than a century of human effort 
and large-scale public investment has produced a system of 
water infrastructure and water delivery that rivals any in the 
world in its breadth and scope. That system is now in crisis. Yet 
many of us—especially those of us who live in urban areas—
scarcely think about water.
Expanding water trading can help us to change the use of 
water in the West. As impressive as our water infrastructure 
may be, over the decades, water management in the West 
has also created perverse economic and legal incentives that 
have led to the overdraft of critical groundwater reserves and 
depleted reservoirs, and that have promoted the overallocation 
of Western rivers and streams.
Some farming regions have made enormous investments in 
efficiency, vastly increasing yields on the same or smaller 
supplies; some cities have aggressively embraced water 
conservation, having doubled or tripled their populations 
without increasing their water use. Others have not made 
investments in efficiency or commitments to conservation, 
and have little incentive to do so. Some Western farms and 
cities are facing substantial shortfalls, even as others have 
abundant, high-priority supplies.
This growing tension is reflected in the substantial and 
increasing disparities in price for water supplies that exist 
between and among urban and agricultural users—a tension 
maintained in part by the legal and institutional rules governing 
the movement of water. Yet even as we restrict water trade, we 
support broad and open trade in the commodities produced 
with water. It seems perverse that farmers in California use 
so much water to grow alfalfa for export to China, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Japan, even as the state struggles through 
the worst drought in memory.
Don’t get us wrong: We are not opposed to using water to 
produce crops for the agricultural export market. The United 
States, after all, is the largest indirect exporter of water on the 
planet. This export is mostly in the form of water embedded in 
wheat, corn, and soybeans. But we would like our farmers—
for example, alfalfa farmers who often use large volumes of 
water to produce extra cuttings in the heat of summer—to 
have the option to use less water and to sell or lease their 
surplus water to protect thirsty cities, high-value permanent 
crops endangered by drought, and job-creating industries.
Water trading can facilitate the reallocation of water to meet 
the demands of changing economies and growing populations. 
It can play a vital role in encouraging conservation and 
stewardship of water supplies in a way that can address 
cultural, social, and environmental priorities. It can facilitate 
building a structure for managing the ever-increasing risks of 
greater variability in water, including through methods such 
as insurance contracts, hedging tools, water banking, and 
other mechanisms. Deploying market tools in the allocation 
of water can help us to overcome the growing fragility and 
vulnerability of the water management institutions and 
infrastructure in the American West.
Chapter 5. Conclusion
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Endnotes
1.  An acre-foot of water is the amount of water it takes to cover an acre of 
land to the depth of 12 inches, roughly 325,000 gallons.
2.  One of the world’s largest aquifers, the Ogallala Aquifer underlies por-
tions of eight states: Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklaho-
ma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming.
3.  This figure comes from the U.S. Geological Survey’s “Estimated Use of 
Water in the United States in 1995” (Solley, Pierce, and Perlman 1998). 
The Survey publishes this estimate every five years. The 1995 report was 
the last one in which the Survey calculated the consumptive use of water 
in agriculture. According to the 1995 estimate, nationwide consumption 
of water was approximately 100 billion gallons per day (BGD). Irrigation 
consumed 81.3 BGD and livestock consumed another 3.2 BGD, for a total 
of 84.5 percent of water consumed. In contrast, nationwide domestic con-
sumption in 1995 was 6.7 BGD, commercial was 1.3 BGD, and industrial 
was 0.7 BGD, for a total of 8.7 BGD (ibid.). More-recent U.S. Department 
of Agriculture estimates conclude that agriculture consumes more than 
80 percent of the nation’s water generally, and more than 90 percent in 
many Western states (USDA 2008a, 2008b).
4.  In most states, a sale or conveyance of a water right in connection with 
the property on which it is used—which does not involve a change in the 
place or purpose of use—is relatively simple to process.
5.  An alternative and relatively similar approach used in other jurisdictions, 
most notably in Australia, has also demonstrated that allowing the sepa-
ration or unbundling of water entitlements from land is an important re-
form that can facilitate water trade (Grafton et al. 2011). 
6.  High Plains A&M, LLC v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy 
District, Supreme Court of Colorado, 120 P.3d 710 (2005).
7.  Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District v. Shelton Farms, 
Inc., 529 P.2d 1321 (Sup. Ct. of Colorado, 1974).
8.  This new market was possible because, among Western states, New Mex-
ico has some of the most precisely defined water rights, which assists in 
the operation of water markets.
9.  Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, Supreme Court of Texas, 369 S.W.3d 
814 (2012).
10.  Natural Resources Defense Council v. Jewell, F.3d (9th Cir. en banc) 
(April 16, 2014).
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4  Informing Students about Their College Options: A Proposal for Broadening the Expanding College Opportunities Project
Highlights
Peter Culp of Squire Patton Boggs, Robert Glennon of the University of Arizona, and Gary Libecap of the University 
of California, Santa Barbara, propose the establishment and use of market mechanisms to encourage reallocation 
and trading of water resources and to provide new tools for risk management. Together, the reforms would build 
resilience into our country’s water management systems and mitigate the water-supply challenges that plague many 
areas of the West.
The Proposal
Reform legal rules that discourage water trading to enable short-term water transfers. Western states would 
remove or provide exceptions to a number of legal doctrines in order to authorize simple, short-term water transfers 
between parties.
Create basic market institutions to facilitate trading of water. Trading platforms, such as water banks, would 
promote longer-term water transactions and transfers and allow markets to operate at a number of scales, such as 
within regions or within the boundaries of urban areas or agricultural districts.
Use risk mitigation strategies to enhance system reliability. The use of market-driven risk management strategies 
would address growing variability and uncertainty in water supplies. These tools include the use of dry-year option 
contracts to provide for water sharing in the face of shortages, and water trusts to protect the environment and 
limit supply risks. New reservoir management strategies that allow for market-driven use of storage would build 
additional resilience into water management systems.
Protect groundwater resources. States would better regulate the use of groundwater, including monitoring 
and limiting use to ensure sustainability, in order to preserve essential groundwater reserves, protect against 
environmental damages, and support the development of effective markets.
Continue and expand federal leadership. Strong federal leadership, from both Congress and the Bureau of 
Reclamation, would help markets work at scale and promote cooperation between states and agencies in water 
management. 
Benefits
The deployment of market tools in the water sector could help mitigate the Western water crisis by facilitating the 
reallocation of water to meet the demands of changing economies and growing populations. Market mechanisms 
can also play an important role in encouraging conservation and stewardship of water supplies in a way that can 
address economic and ecological priorities. Overall, market tools would help overcome the increasing fragility and 
vulnerability of the water management institutions and infrastructure in the West.
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